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WHAT PRICE PROGRESS? URANIUM PRODUCTION
ON INDIAN LANDS IN THE SAN JUAN BASIN
Lise Young*
Introduction
In the wake of the Three Mile Island nuclear incident, new public
scepticism has been generated toward the national policy of nu-
clear power development. Attention has focused primarily on the
most visible parts of the nuclear fuel cycle: the safety of the nu-
clear reactors and to a lesser degree, adequate disposal of the nu-
clear wastes generated by them. There has been surprisingly little
discussion concerning the production of the radioactive raw
material used in the reactors themselves, although this stage of
the fuel cycle affects the economic and physical environments of
dozens of American communities. Most of these communities are
located in the West, on or near Indian lands.
Uranium production in these areas proceeds unabated, despite
increased public scrutiny of other aspects of nuclear power, in-
cluding the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Fueled in part by
the explosive rise in the cost of uranium oxide-the raw stuff of
reactor fuel rods-since the termination of the old Atomic
Energy Commission's (ABC) procurement program in the early
1960s,l in part by new, improved exploration, mining, and pro-
cessing technologies,2 and in part by growth projections for the
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1. The price of a pound of yellowcake soared from $8 in 1973 (shortly after the
demise of the Atomic Energy Commission's procurement program) to $43 in 1978. Root,
Environmental Law Aspects of Extracting and Processing Uranium, 11 NAT. RESOURCES
LAW 419 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Root]. Current prices are running about $51.45 per
pound and are expected to continue to rise. U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY, SOUTHWEST REGION, STATUS REPORT: URANIUM DEVELOPMENT ON FEDERAL
AND INDIAN LANDS, NORTHWEST NEW MEXICO AREA (Sept. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
STATUS REPORT].
2. Uranium production technology is discussed in Part I, infra.
3. Fuel requirements for reactors projected to be on line by 1988 have been
estimated at 60,000 tons of uranium oxide yellowcake per year; by the year 2000 these re-
quirements are expected to more than double. Navajo Nation Environmental Protection
Comm'n, "An Evaluation of Navajo Nation Uranium Reserves and the Residual Impacts
Associated with Reserves Development," 6 (May 1, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Navajo
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1981
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW [Vol. 9
nuclear power industry,3 uranium production is expected to con-
tinue to accelerate.4
Currently the highest concentration of uranium mining and
milling activity occurs in the Southwest, particularly in the San
Juan River Basin of northern New Mexico and southern Colo-
rado. (Figure 1) There are now 34 operating uranium mines in
that area with at least 16 more under development and 7 in the
planning stage.' By 1982, 12 mills are expected to be in operation,
7 more than are presently operational.,
According to one study, to meet the lowest projected uranium
demand for the year 2000, mining and milling capacity in the San
Juan region will have to more than double.' A narrow band of
land, some 20 miles wide by 100 miles long, lying between Albu-
querque and Gallup, New Mexico, and within the geographical
confines of the San Juan Basin, is estimated to contain more than
one-half of the remaining United States uranium reserves, al-
though it comprises only about 10% of the total land area in the
San Juan Basin.'
Almost half of this strip, the Grants Mineral Belt, lies on lands
belonging to the Navajo Nation, Laguna Pueblo, Acoma Pueblo,
and Canoncito Pueblo.9 Uranium production on Indian lands in
the Grants Mineral Belt and elsewhere in New Mexico accounted
EPC Evaluation]. Fifty-five nuclear power plants presently operate in the United States.
An additional 182 plants are in various stages of development. At least 63 of these have
already acquired the requisite permits and 16 are "firmly planned." STATus REPORT,
supra note 1, at 1.
4. If nuclear power expands within the parameters of industry projections, produc-
tion in the San Juan Basin area alone is expected to reach from four to six times its 1977
levels by 1990 and from six to eight times its 1977 levels by the turn of the century. U.S.
Dep't of Interior, San Juan Basin Regional Uranium Study, Environmental Issues and
Uranium Development in the San Juan Basin Region, 1-8 through 1-12 (rough draft, 1978)
[hereinafter cited as Draft San Juan Study].
5. N.M. Energy & Mineral Dep't, An Overview of the New Mexico Uranium In-
dustry, at 72-74, 78, 82-83 (Jan. 1979) [hereinafter cited as N.M. Uranium Overview];
U.S. Dep't of Interior, Final Environmental Impact Statement, Star Lake-Bisti Regional
Coal, 1-22 [hereinafter cited as EIS, Star Lake-Bisti].
6. N.M. Environmental Div., Uranium Mining and Milling; Environmental Effects,
Program Plan, 38 (June 1978).
7. Gibson, Uranium Operations and Employment in the San Juan Basin:
1977-2000, San Juan Basin Regional Uranium Study Working Paper No. 5, at 33, 56, 80,
109 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Draft San Juan Study, Uranium Projections].
8. Draft San Juan Study, supra note 4, at 1-20. Tribal lands in other areas of the
country are undergoing similar "development" including the massive Sherwood Project
production and processing facilities on the Spokane Reservation in Washington State, the
Wind River Reservation in Wyoming, and the Ute Mountain Reservation in the south-
western corner of Colorado.
9. STATus REPORT, supra note 1, at 1.
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for almost half of New Mexico's uranium production in 1974.10
New Mexico, in turn, has supplied nearly 50% of the total
uranium oxide mined in the United States since 1977."1 A single
people, the Navajo Nation, contribute the bulk of this figure,
although production from the huge open-pit uranium mine on
the Laguna Pueblo Reservation is also significant. 2 More than
600,000 acres of Navajo land are presently under lease for
uranium exploration and production, 3 and thousands of acres
more have been suggested for leasing but to date have not yet
been leased.' 4 Leased Navajo lands in the Grants Mineral Belt ac-
count for 15% of the total land area in that strip.'"
The impacts of massive injections of high technology into
remote areas may go unnoticed by the rest of America; however,
they are not lost on the Indian residents of these areas who must
deal with poisoned livestock, boomtown economies, and invasion
of their holy places by insensitive outsiders. Part I of this article
seeks to describe the sociocultural, economic, environmental, and
health impacts uranium production activities have on Indian
lands and culture. Part II describes some of the obstacles con-
fronting tribes who wish to control the pace of uranium produc-
tion on their lands. 16
I. Impacts of Uranium Production on Indian Lands and Society
Environmental Impacts
The uranium reserves of the southwestern United States have
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Since its discovery by Anaconda Corporation in 1951, this mine and the
associated processing mill have produced a total of 80 million pounds of uranium concen-
trate. The mine itself has swallolved up some 2,800 acres of the reservation, with con-
tiguous pits 3 miles long, 500 feet wide, and not more than 300 feet deep. Mine Develop.
ment on United States Indian Lands, ENGINEERING & MINING J. (Jan. 1980 reprint)
[hereinafter cited as E & MJ reprint].
13. This figure represents some 240,000 acres of land leased by 1976, plus an addi-
tiona 400,000 acres (625 square miles) leased to Exxon in 1977.
14. For example, as the price of uranium rises, it can be expected that lands
previously leased and dropped again may have potential for development. STATUS
REPORT, supra note 1, at 10. In addition, at least two mills to accommodate production
from the 400,000-acre Navajo-Exxon lease mines are expected to be built on Navajo
lands. Id. at 12.
15. Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of plaintiff's
motion for partial summary judgment relating to Regional EIS, Peshlakai v. Duncan, 476
F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Peshlakai Points and Authorities].
16. Because of research resource limitations, discussion is for the most part limited
to the Navajo Nation.
[Vol. 9
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been deposited over the millennia by the slow movement of
uranium-bearing groundwater through sandstone rock forma-
tions. Uranium atoms combine with oxygen in the water,
precipitating out as insoluble uranium oxide.' 7 Because of the
slow movement of the groundwater, uranium deposits likewise
"travel," leaving traces of radioactivity and other chemical
changes in the host rock upstream from such deposits. These
chemical tracks provide clues to locating uranium during explora-
tion of promising rock formations."
Significant environmental impacts attend each phase of urani-
um production, from the preliminary exploration of these roll-
front uranium deposits to the final packaging of uranium oxide
as "yellowcake" at the mill.
1. Exploration
The first step in locating uranium reserves is identifying
favorable host rock. This is accomplished by taking numerous
soil, water, and rock samples, conducting aerial photography of
favorable areas, and mapping the location of the results obtained
from test sites.' 9 Such activities usually entail minimal distur-
bance of the surrounding environment.
Once promising rock formations have been identified, ex-
ploratory boreholes are drilled every one to five miles to confirm
the presence of the right sort of rock. 20 If the results of these
preliminary boreholes are positive, further, more intensive drill-
ing follows with holes being sunk progressively closer together.
Eventually, drill holes 6 inches in diameter and from 400-2,000
feet deep"' may be spaced as closely as 12 feet apart. 22 Even
after a deposit has been located amd mining has commenced, ex-
ploratory drilling may continue throughout the life of a mine to
verify and project ore trends.23
17. Deffeyes & MacGregor, World Uranium Resources, 242 SCIENTIFIC AM. 50,
55-57 (Jan. 1980).
18. Davis, Methods of Uranium Exploration, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FDN. INST. ON
URANIUM EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT, at 6-4 (1976).
19. Id. at 6-6.
20. Id. at 6-7.
21. Forest Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Anatomy of a Mine from Prospect to
Production, 1-25 (June 1977) [hereinafter cited as Anatomy of a Mine]. As superficial
layers of uranium have been mined out, increasingly deeper deposits have had to be ex-
plored. The average depth of most exploratory drill holes is presently from 550 tor 800
feet. 196 SCIENCE 606 (1979).
22. N.M. Uranium Overview, supra note 5, at 40.
23. Anatomy of a Mine, supra note 21.
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Drilling activities require moving heavy drill rigs across the
land from one site to another.24 Constant movenent of heavy
equipment, in addition to water trucks and other support
vehicles, often requires bulldozing access roads across fields or
other terrain. 2 Where terrain is flat and sparsely vegetated, the
disturbance may be relatively slight; however, where the
topography is rougher, disturbance from road construction and
the movement of drill rigs may be substantial.2 6
Once a site is reached, it must be flattened and denuded to
facilitate drilling operations.2" Each site measures from one to
one and one-third acres in size.28 Given the extensiveness of ex-
ploratory drilling, the cumulative impacts on surface lands are
substantial: in 1977 alone, some 6,413 exploratory boreholes were
drilled in New Mexico,29 resulting in at least 2,000 acres of highly
disturbed land." In a four-year period, a single oil company,
Mobil Oil, drilled 124 exploratory boreholes on a 160-acre parcel
of Indian land, averaging almost one hole per acre." Not surpris-
ingly, one author has concluded that land disturbance is one of
the most serious problems of drilling.32
Although companies often agree to reclaim lands marred by
exploratory activities, the history of such reclamation efforts is at
best uneven." Given the arid climate of the San Juan Basin, even
conscientious reclamation efforts will most likely result in long-
term destruction of forage grasses.3 4 This could be particularly
devastating to Navajo residents, who depend on local vegetation
for grazing their livestock."
Exploratory drilling also impacts both the air above and the
water below the disturbed surface area of the drill site. Like mine
shafts, drill holes often pass through water-bearing rock layers
which may lie above, below, or within the uranium-bearing
24. N.M. Uranium Overview, supra note 5, at 47.
25. Anatomy of a Mine, supra note 21.
26. N.M. Uranium Overview, supra note 5, at 47.
27. Id.
28. Anatomy of a Mine, supra note 21.
29. N.M. Uranium Overview, supra note 5, at 41-43.
30. Id. at 47-48.
31. Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts Which Are Not in Dispute, Peshlakai v.
Duncan, 476 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C 1979) [hereinafter cited as Peshlakai Facts].
32. N.M. Uranium Overview, supra note 5, at 47.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. U.S. Dep't of Interior, Final Environmental Impact Statement: Navajo-Exxon
Uranium Development, 11-130 (Nov. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Navajo-Exxon EIS].
[Vol. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol9/iss1/2
19811 URANIUM PRODUCTION ON INDIA N LANDS 7
layers. If boreholes are not immediately and securely plugged
after exploration activities are completed, the gap created by the
hole may cause water in high-pressure aquifers (water-bearing
rock strata) to travel up or down the hole to lower-pressure
aquifers. Where the water in these high-pressure aquifers is a
local water source, well levels may drop as the water escapes to
new levels. If a low-pressure aquifer supplies local water wells,
then the influx of high-pressure water may contaminate the low-
pressure aquifer with uranium, radium, selenium, and other toxic
metals."
According to the investigations of at least one group, com-
panies have been derelict in capping exploratory boreholes. 37 In
addition to playing havoc with underground water supplies, un-
capped boreholes also vent radioactive radon gas wherever a ura-
nium-bearing ore has been pierced. 8 Any drill cuttings left
alongside the hole may also give off radon gas. 9
2. Mining
Until recently, uranium was extracted from the earth by the
two techniques that are used in mining other hard minerals: sur-
face (open-pit) and underground mining. In the last ten years or
so, however, a new technology has been developed called in situ
or solution mining. Moreover, with increases in the price of
yellowcake, quantities of uranium that heretofore would have
been economically infeasible to mine have been recovered as an
incident to the processing of other minerals, notably copper and
phosphate.4" Each of the processes and its attendant environmen-
tal impacts will be discussed in turn.
Open-Pit (Surface) Mining
Open-pit mining is familiar to anyone who has seen pictures of
the famous Anaconda open-pit copper mine in Utah. Ore-bearing
rock is exposed by stripping off the material overlying it (the
overburden), which is hauled away in trucks. Ore is blasted loose
36. Report of the Energy Delegation of the National Lawyers Guild, The Front of
the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, 5 (rough draft, July 1980) (statement of Paul Robinson, en-
vironmental expert) [hereinafter cited as Guild Study].
37. Id. at 4.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Lootens, Uranium: Production Methods and Economic Considerations, ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. FDN. INST. ON URANIUM EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT 10-10, 10-11
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Lootens].
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and taken to processing plants. The average waste-to-ore ratio in
uranium open-pit mining operations is 40 tons to 1 ton;4' thus the
logistics of overburden removal are staggering. In fact, because
of the costs involved in removal and disposal of overburden, it is
generally not economically worthwhile to surface mine uranium
at depths of more than 500 feet.42
Surface mining presents the most conspicuous example of land
damage of any of the uranium mining technologies. The Jackpile-
Paguate Mine on the Laguna Pueblo Reservation-the world's
largest open-pit uranium mine-covers some 2,000 acres and is as
much as 300 feet deep. 43 Huge piles of overburden and waste
rock are piled near the mine, which is located only a few hundred
yards away from the village of Paguate.4 4
In addition to monumental land disturbance, open-pit mining
contributes significant amounts of radioactive substances to am-
bient air and water. The exposed ore surfaces in the mine,
amounting to several hundreds of thousands of square feet, emit
radon, a radioactive gas released when uranium-bearing rock is
exposed to the atmosphere. Radon is heavier than air, and con-
centrations of it are probably higher in the deeper parts of the
mine than near ground level. Radon emitted from open-pit mines
may even be trapped in nearby buildings, thereby posing a health
threat to residents. Runoff water traveling across radioactive
mine surfaces and waste piles becomes contaminated surface
water; when it seeps back into underground sources, it carries the
radioactive pollutants with it, causing some radioactive con-
tamination of groundwater supplies in the area. A 1975 En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) study confirmed that rain-
fall and runoff are eroding uranium- and selenium-rich materials
into the Rio Paguate, which flows near the Jackpile-Paguate
Mine.45
Because of the depletion of superficial uranium deposits in the
Southwest, it is highly unlikely that any new open-pit uranium
mines will be opened in the San Juan Basin in the foreseeable
future.4
41. Id. at 10-3.
42. Id. at 10-2.
43. E & MJ reprint, supra note 12.
44. Guild Study, supra note 36, at 10.
45. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Water Quality Impacts of Uranium
", Mining and Milling Activities in the Grants Mineral Belt, New Mexico (Sept. 1975).
46. Lootens, supra note 40, at 10-4.
[Vol. 9
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Underground Mining
Despite its name, underground mining necessitates extensive
above-ground facilities, covering anywhere from 100 to 250
acres.47 A 10- to 20-foot vertical production shaft connecting the
ore-bearing layers with the surface is sunk by drilling or blasting.
Once the ore body has been reached by this main shaft, a net-
work of horizontal tunnels (drifts) is blasted into and adjacent to
the ore zone. 48 Ore is exposed on several faces at once because
production from any single area is limited.4 9 It is then blasted
loose with explosives, loaded into haulage carts, ana transported
to a central receiving point where it is hoisted to the surface.
Unusable ore or waste rock is either dumped outside the mine in-
to a spoils pile or is used as fill material in previously worked sec-
tions. It may even be used in road and dam construction.50
Uranium deposits in the Southwest are usually located beneath
(and sometimes within) water-bearing rock formations or
aquifers. Consequently, these aquifers are usually pierced by the
sinking of mine shafts, causing continual seepage of groundwater
from the aquifer into the mine. For production to continue, this
water must be pumped to the surface and discharged. This
dewatering continues for the life of a mine at a pumping rate of
anywhere from 1,000 to 10,000 gallons per minute. 51 Massive
mine dewatering, with its effects on both water quantity and
water quality in the Southwest, constitutes the major en-
vironmental threat of underground uranium mining operations.
In the San Juan Basin region, the major uranium ore bodies lie
within the Morrison Formation sandstone (specifically, in the
Westwater Canyon Member of that formation), which is the prin-
cipal aquifer for the region."
47. For example, the mines planned for the Dalton Pass area would impact 250 acres
of land directly. Tennessee Valley Authority and U.S. Dep't of Interior, Final En-
vironmental Impact Statement: Dalton Pass Uranium Mines, 37 [hereinafter cited as
Dalton Pass Uranium Mines]. Those at Crownpoint would directly affect about 100 acres.
Tennessee Valley Authority and U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Draft Environmental Impact
Statement: Crownpoint Uranium Mining Project, 44 (June 1978).
48. Lootens, supra note 40, at 10-4.
49. Id.
50. Anatomy of a Mine, supra note 21, at 55-59.
51. Brief of Mobil Oil Corp., Peshlakai Facts, supra note 31, at 13.
52. Lyford, Modeled Effects of Uranium Mine Dewatering on Water Resources in
Northwestern New Mexico, San Juan Basin Regional Uranium Study, Working Paper
No. 37, at 8 (Jan. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Draft San Juan Study, Mine Dewatering Ef-
fects].
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1981
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Because of the high volume of water in the Westwater Canyon
aquifer, dewatering rates at San Juan Basin area mines are quite
high, ranging from 4,500 gallons per minute at two mines located
at Churchrock, New Mexico,5 3 to 8,500 gallons per minute at the
Gulf Mine at Grants, New Mexico.54  The annual withdrawal
from a single Churchrock-type mine amounts to more than 7,000
acre-feet of water.15 If uranium development in the region pro-
ceeds as projected, "moderate" development (72 mines) will
result in the withdrawal of about 1.2 million acre feet of water by
the year 2000; if development proceeds at a "high" rate (105
mines), withdrawal will almost double to a total of 2.025 million
acre-feet in the same period.,
The net result of this immense pumping operation will be a
reduction (drawdown) in the water pressure (head) of the
Westwater Canyon aquifer." These drawdowns are projected to
be anywhere from 1,300 feet to 4,000 feet, depending upon mine
depth and the extent of uranium development that occurs in the
next twenty years.58 In the arid lands of the region, this dewater-
ing can have catastrophic consequences for water supplies already
overtaxed by domestic, industrial, and agricultural demands. 9
Even industry has recognized the severity of the problem:
United Nuclear Corporation's reclamation plans for its Dalton
53. Guyton & Assoc., Production of Water from Westwater Canyon Aquifer Near
Crownpoint, New Mexico by Phillips Uranium Corporation for Uranium Mining, at
15-16 (July 1978) [hereinafter cited as Phillips Water Study].
54. Navajo EPC Evaluation, supra note 3, at 11.
55. Phillips Water Study, supra note 53, at 15-16.
56. Draft San Juan Study, Mine Dewatering Effects, supra note 52, at 6-7.
57. id.
58. For example, pumping from the Phillips mines in the Crownpoint area would
result in a drawdown of 1,300 feet after thirty-one years, and even twenty years after min-
ing has stopped, the drawdown would still be more than 500 feet. The cumulative impacts
of mine dewatering at only "moderate" development rates would result in drawdowns of
4,000 feet in some places with drawdowns of 1,000 feet in a 40-mile-wide by 70-mile-long
strip by the turn of the century. If only those mines currently planned or announced are
constructed, drawdowns of more than 2,000 feet are expected by 1985. Id.
59. Water supplies at Crownpoint are already inadequate to meet fire protection
needs. If development continues as planned, "storage and distribution systems [will be
taxed] to the point that system pressures will be practically nil; ... and either some sort
of rationing, denial of connection privileges to new developments or both, will have to be
instituted to ensure any supply at all to present customer." Environmental Protection
Agency and Economic Development Administration, Draft Environmental Impact State-
ment: Waste-Water Treatment Facilities, Water Supply Facilities, Crownpoint, New Mex-
ico, at 13, 16 (Mar. 1979) [hereinafter cited as EPA-EDA, Crownpoint Water Supply
DEIS].
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol9/iss1/2
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Pass mines recommended that "[d]ependence for new (water)
supplies should not be placed on the Westwater ... because of
the large effects which will be caused by mine pumping.. . in the
area." 6 Studies of the area have revealed that pumping rates are
already exceeding natural replacement rates in some places. 61
The water that is pumped from the mines is discharged into dry
arroyos or ditches on the surface of the mine area. Some inter-
mittent streams have become constant-flowing streams as a result
of mine water discharge. 62
Because this water has been pumped upward through uranium-
bearing strata, it is radioactive and may be contaminated with
significant traces of other toxic elements. 6 A 1975 EPA study of
the Grants Mineral Belt found the Rio Puerco-a stream used for
mine discharges-so polluted with radium, selenium, and vana-
dium that the concentration of each element alone would have
been high enough to render the water unfit for livestock, irriga-
tion, or drinking water. 6' Thus, contamination of surface waters
has already occurred as a result of present mining operations'
dewatering practices.
Contamination is not confined to surface waters. Like explora-
tion boreholes, mine shafts penetrate uranium-bearing and water-
bearing rock formations. As areas are mined out beneath these
layers, the overlying layers collapse into the resulting cavity
(unless large portions of the ore have been left in place or expen-
sive permanent support systems are built), creating vertical frac-
tures.6" These fractures create hydraulic connections between the
60. United Nuclear Corp., Mining and Reclamation Plans: Dalton Pass Uranium
Mines, McKinley County, New Mexico, at 9.3-19 (Jan. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Dalton
Pass EIS].
61. U.S. Dep't of Interior, Final Environmental Impact Statement: Federal Coal
Management Program, 4-44 (Apr. 1979).
62. One investigation observed a continuous 10-feet-wide flow in a streambed that
was previously dry during summer months. Guild Study, supra note 36, at 9. The author
worked on a case involving a similar situation: a Navajo landowner objected to excessive
radioactive water discharges into a dry gully that bordered his land because his livestock
were using the new "river" as a watering hole and he was worried that they might become
ill.
63. Kunkler, Impacts of the Uranium Industry on Water Quality, San Juan Basin
Regional Uranium Study, Working Paper No. 22, at 23 (Oct. 1978) [hereinafter cited as
Draft San Juan Study, Water Quality Impacts].
64. See note 45, supra. The same EPA study revealed levels as much as 30 times the
suggested EPA standards for radium in drinking water supplies and 38 times the natural
groundwater concentration.
65. Navajo-Exxon EIS, supra note 35, at 111-33.
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inferior-quality water of overlying Dakota sandstone and the
high-quality Westwater Canyon aquifer water." Under normal
conditions, the higher-pressure Westwater layer might still purge
itself of contamination from the lower-pressure Dakota sand-
stone aquifer, but because mine dewatering draws enormous
quantities of water from the Westwater the pressure has been
reduced, permitting an influx of inferior-quality water into the
Westwater.67 This flow of inferior water into potable water
sources will continue until pressure can be restored in the
Westwater aquifer."1
Here again, as with surface water contamination, observations
have confirmed predictions:
1. Marked deterioration of water quality in the Westwater
aquifer in the Ambrosia Lake area has already occurred because
of a suspected connection between that layer and the local
Dakota sandstone. 69
2. Groundwater in the domestic water supply downgradient' °
from the United Nuclear-Homestake Partners Mill was contamin-
ated with selenium, a toxic metal, in concentrations 340 times
normal background and recommended drinking water levels."
3. San Mateo, a village less than 100 yards from a Gulf urani-
um mine, experienced a gray, greasy discharge from its main
water well in June of 1979. Ironically, this well had been drilled
at Gulf's expense after the water level in the first well dropped
more than 60 feet, shortly after Gulf's mining operation first
began.72
Groundwater pollution is also caused when contaminated dis-
charge water, pumped to the surface and left to evaporate from
ponds, seeps back into the groundwater whence it originated."
This process has been documented by the Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) prepared for the Dalton Pass uranium mines.74
Although 200,000 kilograms of uranium have been introduced to
66. Id.
67. Peshlakai Points and Authorities, supra note 15, at 31.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 32.
70. Downgradient is to groundwater as downstream is to surface flow.
71. Navajo EPC Evaluation, supra note 3, at 14.
72. Guild Study, supra note 36, at 4.
73. Discharge water is contaminated when water dissolves the uranium out of the
rock. Seepage of this contaminated water back into underground water thus carries the
dissolved uranium with it.
74. Dalton Pass Uranium Mines, supra note 47, at 195.
[Vol. 9
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the surface by mine dewatering, 75 companies have yet to perfect
methods for either purification of the carrier water for reuse or
for recovery of the dissolved uranium.76
Finally, a distinctive feature of underground uranium mines is
the presence of ventilation shafts and fans to force "bad air"
containing radioactive gases out of the mine and to pull "good
air" from the outside into the shafts and drifts. Although such
measures no doubt improve the quality of the air inside the mine,
they necessarily degrade the air quality outside the mines to some
extent. The magnitude of this deterioration has not been carefully
monitored; however, an EPA study conducted in 1978 revealed
that Santa Fe, New Mexico, although 100 miles from the nearest
uranium mine, had the nation's third highest concentration of
uranium-238 in its air.17 Of course, other factors may be respons-
ible for this phenomenon, but the possibility remains that
underground mining may pollute aboveground air at considerable
distances from the mines themselves.
In Situ (Solution) Mining
Similar to the water injection method used in the oil industry
for several years, in situ solution mining of uranium basically in-
volves pumping uranium in solution from its host rock rather
than using physical means to remove the solid ore. Since this
greatly simplifies extraction, solution mining operations are being
scrutinized with great interest by industry giants looking for ways
to cut costs. 78 Mobil Oil has recently instituted an in situ opera-
tion on an experimental basis near Crownpoint, New Mexico. 79
Solution mining entails the drilling of three distinct types of
wells. (Figure 2) Strongly acidic or alkaline solution is pumped in-
to an injection well (sunk by conventional means) at a controlled
pressure. This leach solution migrates through the permeable,
ore-bearing sandstone and dissolves uranium particles in the rock
in a process essentially the reverse of that which first deposited
the uranium in the rock. This leachate is drawn from the rock by
pumping it back out of a production well or wells at a higher rate
75. Navajo EPC Evaluation, supra note 3, at 15.
76. EPA-EDA, Crownpoint Water Supply DEIS, supra note 59, at 35.
77. Cited in Peterson, Lung Cancer Rate Among Uranium Miners Five Times
Higher than National Average, NAT'L HEALTH FED'N BULL., at 29 (Mar. 1980).
78. Lootens, supra note 40, at 10-6, 10-8.
79. This operation was in part the subject of the Peshlakai suit. Peshlakai Facts,
supra note 31.
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than the injection well pumps leach solution in.8 0 Thus, the
pressure gradient results in a net withdrawal of fluids instead of a
net injection, as is the case in oil operations.8 ' The leach zone is
cased to prevent seepage of the toxic leach solution into adjacent
strata and monitoring wells are drilled around the leach area and
above the ore zone to detect escapes of any leachate into con-
tiguous rock layers. 2 These escapes are called excursions. After
being pumped to the surface, leachate is shipped to a conven-
tional mill for final processing into yellowcake.13
Initially, one should note that as with all uranium mining ac-
tivities, significant land impacts attend in situ operations. The
InJeotion
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well
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FIG. 2
80. Lootens, supra note 40, at 10-5. See Figure 2.
81. Friedman, Environmental Problems Relating to Uranium Mining and Milling, II
NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 277, 289-90 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Friedman].
82. Id.
83. Lootens, supra note 40, at 10-5.
[Vol. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol9/iss1/2
1981] URANIUM PRODUCTION ON INDIAN LANDS 15
Mobil in situ operation at Crownpoint occupies a 6-acre area and
includes 13 wells (9 injection and 4 production) sunk to depths of
as much as 2,000 feet. Only one monitor well has been sunk.
There is also a large waste disposal pond on the site in addition to
trailers, tanks, pumps, and storage space.1 In the course of set-
ting up the operation, the site was totally denuded, substantial
earthmoving occurred, and evidence of extensive off-road travel
was visible.15 A ranching and range management specialist called
the condition of the land a disaster area."
The most serious effects of the in situ technique, however, con-
cern the water quality impacts of such operations. The Mobil
project is located quite close to water wells for the town of
Crownpoint. 7 Consequently, once injection of leach chemicals
into the formation begins, it can be expected that the levels of
several toxic and radioactive pollutants in nearby parts of the
aquifer will rise significantly.88 Excursions of leachate vertically
into other formations or horizontally into other areas of the
Westwater Canyon aquifer are likely to occur: the United States
Geological Service (USGS) has stated that "there is a significant
possibility of vertical migration of the in situ leachate." 8 9
Although Mobil has attempted to assuage fears by referring to
its past record of in situ mining in Texas, serious criticisms of this
comparison have been leveled by the USGS, as well as by in-
dependent hydrology experts. For instance:
1. The USGS has stated that it is invalid to correlate the
leaching proposed in New Mexico with that done in Texas
because:
(a) the Texas fields are only 700 feet deep; Crownpoint
wells reach up to 2,000 feet;
84. Peshlakai Facts, supra note 31, at 46.
85. Id. at 47.
86. Id.
87. A mining engineer for the Bureau of Indian Affairs noted that the project is only
four miles from Crownpoint and that the Westwater aquifer, the town's main source of
water, was the formation to be leached. Mobil Oil Corp., Interim Mining and Reclama-
tion Plans for Pilot Testing of In Situ Uranium Leaching: Crownpoint Project, McKinley
County, New Mexico, at 113-15 (May 1978) [hereinafter cited as Mobil In Situ Mining
Plan].
88. U.S. Geological Survey, Environmental Analysis: Mobil Oil Corporation Pro-
posed Pilot Testing of In Situ Uranium Leaching, Crownpoint Project, Lease No.
NOO-C-14-20-4938, McKinley County, New Mexico, at 107.
89. U.S. Dep't of Interior, Letter of comments on the Draft Environmental Impact
Statement for Mobil's Crownpoint Uranium Project (Feb. 17, 1978).
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(b) the Texas fields are capped by a homogenous layer of
shale impervious to excursions; the Crownpoint field is capped by
shale with sand and silt "stringers" through which excursions
could travel;
(c) the Texas fields are not being dewatered; the Mobil site
will receive extensive dewatering1 0
2. An independent hydrologist has confirmed the USGS
predictions and has also rejected comparisons drawn by the in-
dustry between water flooding in oil extraction operations and
leachate injection in uranium operations." According to this
authority, oil-bearing formations are more homogenous than ura-
nium-bearing layers; therefore, fluid movements in oil-bearing
formations can be more consistently predicted than those occur-
ring in uranium-rich strata.
Furthermore, the expert found that two monitor wells proposed
by Mobil would not be adequate to assure detection of excur-
sions. In fact, Mobil had completed only one monitor well as of
the summer of 1979. That single well reaches levels below those in
which some residents' wells are located, so that a vertical excur-
sion into layers above the well might not be detected. 2
Although Mobil points to its "excellent record" in its Texas
operations, closer examination reveals that the record is not so
excellent after all. On August 21 and 22, 1978, Mobil detected an
excursion in its Texas operation. The excursion apparently was
the result of fluid escape through the cracked casing of an injec-
tion well. Leachate was detected in an overlying aquifer, not by
any monitor well, but as a result of monitoring injection rates.
Although cleanup was promptly initiated, complete restoration
had still not been achieved almost one full year later. 3 Likewise,
present in situ operations in Wyoming have experienced several
moderately severe incidents of leakage. In March of 1979, for ex-
ample, the Wyoming Mining Corporation detected an excursion
of leachate in two of.its five in situ well fields. In April it detected
another excursion in a third well. The company halted operations
in two of its well fields as a result of the excursions. No improve-
ment was noted until almost two months later after the company
90. Id.
91. Letter from John R. Meadows to James F. Burger, Sept. 29, 1978; Peshlakai
Facts, supra note 31, at 41-42.
92. Peshlakai Facts at 43.
93. Letters from Mobil to Texas Department of Water Resources, Aug. 24, 1978, in
id. at 42.
[Vol. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol9/iss1/2
19811 URANIUM PRODUCTION ON INDIAN LANDS 17
had initiated a new corrective technique.94 These descriptions are
in stark contrast to optimistic industry-oriented articles which
underreport the cleanup time (36 days for the Texas excursion)
and overestimate the state of the art of reclamation.9
Neither expert opinion nor laboratory pilot testing supports in-
dustry assertions that water quality in affected aquifers can be
reclaimed to substantially preoperational levels.9 6 In fact, even
Mobil retreated from early assertions that it would restore water
quality to baseline values over the course of project development,
eventually agreeing only to restore water quality to New Mexico
state standards, which would permit 500% increases in concentra-
tions of barium, cadmium, chromium, selenium, silver, lead, and
cobalt; 1,000% increases in arsenic, sulphates, and aluminum;
300 times original uranium concentrations, and at least 300 times
original copper and zinc concentrations. Radium concentrations
would be allowed to double.97
Finally, in situ operations generate excess production fluids
that must be disposed of. The Mobil operation apparently
disposes of its waste in a large pond; other operations may inject
their wastes back into subsurface disposal wells.98 Obviously,
pollution problems here are similar to those encountered in the
discharge and runoff of contaminated water from underground
94. Id.
95. Friedman, supra note 81, at 290, states unequivocally that, "Restoration of the
uranium ore zone is not expected to materially affect ground water reserves" He also
paints a glowing picture of the in situ method and minimizes the incidents of "escapes"
from such operations. Id. at 289-90.
96. Officials of the U.S. Bureau of Mines have stated that "restoration involves
greater uncertainties than any other aspect of leaching." Tweeton, Anderson &
Englemann, Bureau of Mines Research in Injection Well Construction and Environmental
Aspects of In Situ Uranium Leach (paper presented at the 1978 Annual Meeting of
American Institute of Mining Engineering). The USGS has said that aquifer restoration is
an "unanswered question." U.S. Geological Survey, Environmental Analysis: Proposed
Canyon Uranium Mining and Reclamation Plan, at 16 (Mar. 7, 1979). The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission has stated in a study that restoration of leach field water to
original parameters "will be very difficult, if not impossible." Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission, Thompson et al., Groundwater Elements of In Situ Leach Mining of Uranium,
at 59 (Aug. 1978). A restoration test in Mobil's field in south Texas brought water quality
up to Texas standards, but would have failed to meet New Mexico standards, which still
allow substantial amounts of pollutants to remain in the water (see text accompanying
note 97) Peshlakai Facts, supra note 31, at 45. Laboratory reclamation tests have failed to
restore original values for 29 of the 40 substances measured. Mobil In Situ Mining Plan,
supra note 87, at 28-31.
97. Peshlakai Facts, supra note 31, at 44.
98. Friedman, supra note 81, at 290.
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mines and the injection of toxic leach chemicals into rock in the
first instance.
Heap Leaching
Heap leaching, like solution mining, involves the leaching of
uranium from its host rock. It is used primarily to recover urani-
um from low-grade ores produced from underground or surface
mining activities or the mining of deposits containing other
marketable minerals in addition to uranium (e.g., phosphate and
copper)."
Ore is piled on an impermeable pad of clay or other material
and is doused thoroughly with a leach solution. The leachate is
diverted away from the pile and shipped to a conventional pro-
cessing mill for final concentration into yellowcake.
Heap leaching is employed on a limited scale and thus does not
involve the same magnitude of environmental hazards as do other
methods. However, if the leachate is not carefully contained,
contamination of surface and groundwaters by runoff and seep-
age would parallel that experienced in conventional mining tech-
niques. The problem could be particularly severe if the pad upon
which the pile is placed is not absolutely impermeable to fluids, a
standard that may be impossible to meet.
3. Uranium Processing (Dressing, Milling)
Crude ore produced from conventional mining methods is not
the product eventually sold to the power industry; it must be re-
fined and processed in order to concentrate the uranium oxide
content. This is accomplished in two stages: first, the crude ore is
pulverized until it is a uniform sand-like consistency. 00 This pro-
vides the maximum amount of surface area for chemical reactions
involved in the second stage. Second, the crushed ore undergoes a
series of leaching and precipitation processes that serve to con-
centrate and purify the uranium oxide into the final mill product,
which is yellowcake, a yellowish-colored, sandy solid.' 1'
Ore dressing requires the use of large quantities of harsh
chemicals, such as sulfuric acid, sodium carbonate, ammonia,
and ammonium hydroxide, as solvents and precipitating agents.
Because uranium oxide accounts for only about 1-5% of the total
volume of ore mined, the major part of these chemicals combined
99. Lootens, supra note 40, at 10-4.
100. Root, supra note 1, at 445.
101. Lootens, supra note 40, at 10-5.
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with the waste ore comprise mill residues called tailings. This
sludge-like material is piped as a liquid from the mill to tailings
ponds where the liquids evaporate, leaving behind the monstrous
piles of dried tails characteristic of uranium and other mineral
mills. These tails are highly radioactive, containing 85% of all of
the radiation in the raw uranium."'2
The state of New Mexico now supports at least 10 tailings piles,
5 or more of which are still in production. Together, these piles
cover more than 1,000 acres and contain nearly 60 million tons of
radioactive waste materials.103 If growth in the uranium industry
in the San Juan Basin region proceeds as projected, there will be
up to 22 mills in the area by the year 2000 and nearly 300 million
tons of tailings, a quantity sufficient to cover the city of Albu-
querque to a depth of 22 inches. 4 The tailings disposal problem
is especially acute in this area because most ores mined in the San
Juan Basin contain less than one-quarter of 1% uranium oxide
per ton.' Hence, proportionately more waste is produced per
ton of ore than is the case with richer ores.
As these ore bodies are depleted, still lower ore grades will be
mined, leading to further increases in the production of tailings
per ton of ore. Therefore, if uranium oxide production doubles,
tailings generation will more than double. Between 1966 and
1976, the ratio of tailings to yellowcake for all domestic uranium
ores has in fact increased by one-third; thus, these projections
have already been verified. 106
Because of the economics of hauling enormous amounts of ore
to processing plants, mills are usually located close to the mines
they serve. At least seven mining projects on Navajo lands have
already been proposed. 7 If one mill is required for approximately
every five mines,0 8 these new projects alone will mandate the
construction of at least one major mill on Navajo lands.
The impact of such mills with their associated tailings dumps is
awesome. A typical mill site may cover 1,500 acres of land, with
102. Root, supra note 1, at 445.
103. New Mexico Uranium Overview, supra note 5, at 122-23.
104. Id.
105. FEDERAL ENERGY ADMIN., NEW MEXICO URANIUM 1950-2000, at 14 (Dec. 1976).
106. Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978: Hearings on H.R. 1480
Before the Subcomm. on Energy & Power, Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce,
95th Cong., 2d Sess., 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7433 (testimony of David M.
Berick) [hereinafter cited as Hearings, Mill Tailings Control Act].
107. Peshlakai Facts, supra note 31, at 39.
108. Draft San Juan Study, Uranium Projections, supra note 7, at 109.
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perhaps 900 acres set aside for the actual milling facilities, tailings
disposal areas, and associated roads. 0 9 As the tails dry out, tail-
ings dust is carried by the wind to points many miles distant from
the mill. Until the enactment of the Uranium Mill Tailings Radia-
tion Control Act in 1978,' the massive radioactive tailings piles
produced as a result of ore dressing were not subject to a cohesive
system of regulation. While the Act and associated regulations
have alleviated this source of contamination somewhat by requir-
ing more careful tails management, site checks of four New Mexico
uranium mills in 1979 by an official from the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) revealed substantial disparities in the condi-
tion of the respective tailings piles,"' suggesting that airborne
radioactivity from tailings has not been eradicated.
Substantial groundwater contamination from the seepage of
leachate liquids and radioactive residues of the milling process
has also been documented. Toxic substances from drying tailings
piles seep into the ground beneath the ponds, contaminating local
groundwater supplies. Surface waters from rainstorms that flow
across the piles also pick up radioactive and toxic pollutants (such
as uranium, thorium, radium, polonium, and bismuth), which
likewise eventually seep back into groundwater sources. At Ana-
conda's Bluewater operations, for example, a 1975 EPA study
found that seepage constituted 8% of the flow into the tailings
ponds, causing some 12,000 cubic meters per year of toxic solu-
tions to leach into the shallow drinking water aquifer beneath the
area." 2 Kerr-McGee's Ambrosia Lake tailings pond had an even
worse record: almost one-third (29%) of the total influents, or
496,400 cubic meters per year, were seeping into underground
water supplies. " 13
Since passage of the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control
109. N.M. Uranium Overview, supra note 5, at 119.
110. Regulations detailing compliance with the provisions of the Act were first
published in the Federal Register on Aug. 24, 1979. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7901 et seq. (Supp.
1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 50,012, 50,015.
111. Inspections by J. Bazemore of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in September
of 1979 disclosed substantial windblown tailings at the Kerr-McGee mill and a lack of
formal stabilization or reclamation plans at either this mill or the nearby United Nuclear-
Homestake Partners mill. Oversight Hearing on the Mill Tailing Dam Break at Church
Rock, New Mexico, Before the Subcomm. on Energy & Environment of the Comm. on
Interior & Insular Affairs, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (Oct. 22, 1979), at 113-16 [hereinafter
cited as Hearings, Dam Break].
112. Environmental Protection Agency, Water Quality Impacts of Uranium Mining
and Milling Activities in the Grants Mineral Belt, New Mexico (Sept. 1975).
113. Id.
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Act, however, most companies have instituted monitoring programs
and improved tailings management; but once again industrial
compliance with federal regulations has in some instances been
less than exemplary. I ' Present regulations require tailings piles to
be located on an impermeable base, sprayed with water or per-
mitted to "crust over" to keep down dusting as residual liquids
evaporate. Some piles are buried beneath one to several feet of
dirt or clay. 311 However, even extraordinary care will not control
all radioactive and toxic emissions from tailings piles."' And
alternative disposal methods (such as deep well injection of
wastes) could result in serious contamination of underground
waters." 7 Thus, despite the congressional mandate of the
Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act, uranium tailings
heaps remain a potent-and growing-threat to the physical en-
vironment and to human health." 8
An ominous illustration of the hazards of mill tailings disposal
occurred on July 16, 1979, at the United Nuclear Corporation
processing facility at Church Rock, New Mexico. On that day, a
massive crack cleaved an earthen dam, spilling more than 93
million gallons of contaminated liquids and 1,100 tons of
radioactive solid wastes from the corporation's tailings pond into
a dry arroyo that empties into the Rio Puerco. The Rio Puerco, a
stream used by Navajo herdsmen as a watering hole for their
livestock, carried the residues more than 100 miles. 1 9
Ironically, this dam had been a new, improved design, using
earth instead of tailings themselves to dam the tailings pond,
recommended by the NRC itself. " ' Special design criteria had
114. Bazemore documented a significant groundwater contamination problem at the
Kerr-McGee mill. Hearings, Dam Break, supra note 111, at 113-16.
115. Hearings, Mill Tailings Control Act, supra note 106, at 151 (statement of Maxie
L. Anderson, Ranches Exploration and Development Corp.)
116. A General Accounting Office study released in June of 1977 reported that ex-
isting technology cannot fully control radioactive releases from tailings piles. Hearings,
Mill Tailings Control Act, supra note 106, at 435. This conclusion was confirmed in the
EIS prepared by Exxon in preparation for the approval of its 400,000-acre lease on Navajo
lands. Navajo-Exxon EIS, supra note 35, at 1-27.
117. Deep well injection of milling wastes was being used by the Anaconda Corpora-
tion at one of its processing sites as recently as 1978. Navajo EPC Evaluation, supra note
3, at 14.
118. If uranium development proceeds as projected in the San Juan Basin area, some
2,291 acres or more of la'nd will be made permanently unusable for any purpose other
than uranium tailings dumps. N.M. Uranium Overview, supra note 5, at 109.
119. Hearings, Dam Break, supra note 111, at 1 (testimony of Morris K. Udall).
120. Id. at 29 (testimony of Professor Lawrence A. Hansen).
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been devised by the NRC prior to licensing of the dam. However,
the corporation did not follow these criteria. 2 ' Nor did it under-
take regular inspections of the completed dam, although indepen-
dent consultants hired by the firm had strongly recommended
that it do so.' 22 Even after a consulting firm had observed and
notified the corporation of a dangerously high settlement rate
and the beginnings of small cracks in the dam as of 1977, it still
took little or no preventive action. 23 At lease three federal and
state regulatory agencies overseeing the licensing and construction
of the dam could have predicted that the dam would break, but
failed to do so.124
The spill immediately contaminated the waters of the Rio Puer-
co and Little Colorado rivers, rendering them unfit for consump-
tion by humans or livestock. Navajo residents were instructed not
to use the water or to eat livestock that had drunk the con-
taminated water,'M but many Navajos could neither read the
newspaper reports of the spill nor the signs posted by government
officials in the affected areas.
Although contamination of the surface waters was transitory,
elevated levels of radioactive contaminants-predominantly
thorium and heavier metals involved in uranium proces-
sing-deposited by the waters in streambeds and in the areas
flooded by the spill have been measured at points downstream
from the dam. 26 Contaminants from the spill have also seeped
into shallow groundwater sources near the site.' 27 The potential
health danger from these pollutants is the subject of vigorous
debate. The corporation, the EPA, and NRC officials insist that
near-background levels have been restored in surface and ground-
water supplies, leaving only the solid "salts" deposited by the
waters of the spill as a possible source of radioactivity. Indepen-
dent consultants insist that the threat is much greater because the
elements released are not as transitory as those released in the
Three Mile Island incident.' 28 Although cleanup began promptly
and the corporation removed riverbed sediments contaminated by
121. Id. at 106.
122. Id. at 2.
123. Id. at 2, 3.
124. Id. at 2.
125. Id. at 14 (testimony of Helen George).
126. Id. at 36 (testimony of William Dircks, Nuclear Regulatory Commission).
127. Id. at 48 (testimony of Paul Robinson, Southwest Research and Information
Center).
128. Id. at 40-47, 78-79.
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the spill to its tailings dump over a period of more than three
months,'29 the ultimate effects of the spill-if any-have yet to be
determined.
Church Rock was by no means the first tailings spill in the
history of the United States uranium processing industry: be-
tween 1959 and 1977, there were at least 15 spills of tailings, 7 of
which involved dam failures.' 30 Another United Nuclear Cor-
poration facility experienced a tailings spill that completely
covered the company's mill and mill yard with some 55 cubic
yards of solids; yet another incident released 35,000 gallons of
tailings slurry into the Colorado River.' Given the present
design of most tailings dams, future spills are a virtual certainty
unless companies are held to strict design standards and continual
monitoring of their tailings dams.
Health Impacts
Prior to the beginning of United States uranium mining opera-
tions in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Europe had already ex-
perienced firsthand the health hazards involved in the industry.
For more than five centuries, one-third to one-half of the miners
in the Schneeberg mining region of southern Germany and the
Joachimthall region of modern Czechoslovakia had regularly in-
curred a fatal respiratory disease, finally diagnosed as lung cancer
in 1880.132 However, this bleak history went unnoticed by the
United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in the early
days of uranium mining.
During the period of the AEC's monopoly over uranium pro-
duction and distribution, miners were sent to work in uranium
mines ("dog holes") without ventilation, where they were exposed
to radiation levels 30 to 40 times the permissible rate today. 33
Miners were given no warnings concerning the dangers of
radioactivity in the mines nor of the especially deadly effect
129. Id. at 37, 40-47.
130. Id. at 9 (testimony of Dr. Thomas Gesell).
131. Id. at 2.
132. Radiation Exposure of Uranium Miners: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Research & Development of the Comm. on Atomic Energy, 90th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. I at
140 (May 9, 10, 23; June 6-9; July 26, 27; Aug. 8, 10, 1967) [hereinafter cited as Hear-
ings, Radiation].
133. Occupational Health Hazards of Older Workers in New Mexico: Hearings
Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 30, 1979)
(testimony of Harold Tso, Director, Navajo Environmental Protection Commission)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings, Health Hazards].
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smoking cigarettes had on lung tissue when combined with a
radon-rich environment.13 ' Provided with no pure water source,
they would drink the radioactive water that constantly seeped
from the mine walls. 13"
Federal recognition of the problems associated with uranium
mining was painfully slow. The first federal "supervision" was
initiated in the late 1960s, but it amounted to little more than a
paper tiger: inspectors would sporadically poke their heads into
the mines and then beat a hasty retreat from the smoke and dust,
since they had no authority to do anything else.' 3 ' Although it
was understood by 1950 that the prime source of radioactivity in
underground mines was the decay of radioactive radon gas-an
unstable element-into more stable decay products called radon
daughters, no federal standard for radon exposure was set until
1967.'" In 1970 the first federal legislation with any teeth in it
became effective;' 3' however, application of its provisions for
mandatory inspections was hampered by long compliance times
and cumbersome enforcement procedures. 39 It was not until
1978, the effective date of the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Act,"'4 that uranium miners were finally assured some meaningful
protection of their right to work in a reasonably safe environ-
ment.
This legislation came too late to help those miners who had
started uranium mining under the AEC's stewardship.' 4 ' Begin-
ning in 1950, the Public Health Service (PHS) had initiated a
filed survey of the incidence of various diseases, particularly lung
cancer, among uranium miners. By then it was known that radon
134. Id. at 3.
135. Id. at 34.
136. Id. at 3-9, 54.
137. Id. at 9.
138. Federal Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 721-741 (Supp.
1981).
139. Hearings, Health Hazards, supra note 133, at 55.
140. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. (Supp. 1981)
141. Legislation to provide compensation to these miners, many of whom have never
been able to qualify for state workers compensation, has been pending in Congress in one
form or another for almost five years. The first bill, S. 3199, introduced in 1977 by
Senator Peter Domenici of New Mexico, was subjected to severe criticism and eventually
died. Senator Domenici's latest effort, S. 1827, was introduced in 1979 and has recently
been combined with another bill aimed at compensating victims of the Nevada nuclear
tests, S. 1865. Joint Hearings on S. 1865 Before the Subcomm. on Health & Scientific
Research of the Comm. on Labor & Human Resources and the Comm. on the Judiciary,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 10, 1980).
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daughters from the decay of radon gas attach themselves to dust
particles in the mine environment, which causes uneven irradiation
of lung tissue when inhaled by miners.' 4 2 The results of the PHS
survey showed a mortality rate from cancer from 2 to 40 times the
expected rate, depending upon the total exposure received by
miners.' 43 The PHS findings also identified a 10- to 20-year delay
in the onset of lung cancer and a markedly higher incidence of
lung cancer in uranium miners who smoked cigarettes.'
44
Due to this extended lag time, confirmed cases of uranium
mining-related cancers are only now reaching epidemic propor-
tions. The observed mortality rate is exceeding the expected rate
by a factor of 5,145 and even among nonsmoking Navajo miners,
the lung cancer mortality rate has now been demonstrated to be
significantly greater than expected.' 46
Controls instituted by serveral western states in the early 1960s
142. Hearings, Radiation, supra note 132, at 140.
143. Government and industry have adopted the standard of a working level (WL) to
measure exposure to the concentration of radon daughters. One WL is defined as the
total radon daughter emissions in one liter of air that will total 1.3 x 101 million electron
volts of potential alpha energy from the radioactive decay of the radon daughters. Ex-
posure is measured in working level months (WLM). One WLM equals the level of ex-
posure to radioactive daughters incurred by working in an environment of one WL for
one month (170 hours). The correlation between exposure to radiation and increased in-
cidence of death was found to be as follows:
Exposure Expected Observed Increased
Mortality Mortality Incidence
120-840 WLM 3.1* 4.9 1.2
840-1,799 WLM 3.9 18.2 4.7
1800-3,719 WLM 4.8 50. 10.
more than 3,720 WLM 4.3 171. 40. +
* per 10,000 man years
Hearings, Radiation, supra note 132, at 141. Experts have estimated that 45% of the
uranium miners working in unventilated mines between 1940 and 1950 were exposed to
WL concentrations in excess of 10 WL daily and 16% were exposed to more than 50 WL.
Hearings, Health Hazards, supra note 133, at 60.
144. Hearings, Radiation, Part II, supra note 132, at 1336. However, even after the
data was adjusted to allow for cigarette smoking, the pattern of lung cancer persisted, in-
dicating that smoking alone could not have accounted for the increased incidence. Id.,
Part I, at 141. Many companies instituted "no smoking" rules after 1967 in response to
the PHS findings. Hearings, Health Hazards, supra note 133, at 51.
145. Hearings, Health Hazards, supra note 133, at 56-62 (testimony of Joseph K.
Waggoner, Special Assistant for Occupational Carcinogenesis, Occupational Safety &
Health Administration).
146. Id. at 61.
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succeeded in reducing mine radiation significantly by 1967.1"1
Originally set at 12 WLM by the United States Department of
Labor in 1967,148 the maximum exposure level was reduced to 4
WLM in 1971.149 According to at least one industry official, the
average working level exposure of uranium miners as of 1978 was
well under this federal standard. 50 Present regulations call for
mandatory sampling of mine air and maintenance of monitoring
records to ensure compliance with these standards, in addition to
records of exposure levels experienced by individual miners.'
Thus, today the mine radiation hazard is clearly nowhere near
the magnitude of that experienced by early miners. Better ventila-
tion, increased safety education, and the use of wetting agents to
keep down dust have helped minimize mine radioactivity. What
effect the lower radiation exposure levels will have on health is
the subject of a study begun in 1977 by the state of New Mexico
and the University of New Mexico. 5 2 Because of the 10- to
20-year delay in the onset of mining-related cancer, however, the
results of this study will not be available for years to come.
Attention is now shifting to the outside of the mines, where the
venting that saves miners' lives is coming to be regarded as a
potentially significant health hazard to surface workers and the
general populace nearby. Vent emissions are presently not
regulated by either the federal or state governments. It is thus
possible that radioactivity from mines, once vented to the ex-
terior, could travel downwind for many miles, posing a health
threat to communities some distance from the mines. For ex-
ample, an EPA study published in 1978 recorded the nation's
third highest concentration of U-238 in the air around Santa Fe,
New Mexico, although Santa Fe is 100 miles from the nearest ura-
nium mining activity."5 3 At the very least, it poses a threat to
nearby residents. Investigators for one study observed open mine
shafts within yards of Navajo dwellings;' 54 at the Laguna Pueblo
147. Beverly, Development and Legislation of Environmental Regulations for Mining,
15 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 163, 171 (1969).
148. Id. at 170-71.
149. Hearings, Health Hazards, supra note 133, at 48-53.
150. Id. at 48 (testimony of Langan Swent, Vice President of Engineering, Homestake
Mining Corp.).
151. 30 C.F.R. §§ 57.5-33 through 57.5-47 (1979), amended 44 Fed. Reg. 31,908
(June 1, 1979).
152. Hearings, Health Hazards, supra note 133, at 48.
153. See Peterson, supra note 77.
154. Guild Study, supra note 36, at 6.
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operations, a vent discharges dust and gas only a short distance
from a schoolyard.'"
Uranium Milling Health Hazards
With the improvement of underground uranium mining en-
vironments, concern has arisen over radiological air pollution
from other stages of uranium production. The NRC has found
that, although radioactive dust is abundant in mines, the major
source of the dust is the tailings from the processing of ore into
yellowcake. 1'" In fact, radioactivity from exposed tailings piles
has been called "the dominant radiation exposure from the
nuclear fuel cycle" by no less an authority than the former chair-
man of the NRC himself. 157
The primary sources of radioactivity emanating from tails are
radon gas and its daughters, and alpha, gamma, and beta radia-
tion.'58 Radon emissions from tailings may persist for 100,000
years or more,15 9 although the half-life of radon itself is only
about four days, once it is released to the atmosphere. 60
The release of radon and particulates increases dramatically as
mill tailings dry out: The NRC found that five years after mill
shutdown, radionuclide exposure from radon gas and particulates
increased by as much as 60% for people living within a 50-mile
radius of the mill.'"' William Rowe, former Deputy Assistant Ad-
ministrator for Radiation Programs of the EPA, testified in con-
gressional hearings that radon gas is so highly carcinogenic that
even reestablishing background levels of radioactivity at mill tail-
ings sites would still approximately double the lung cancer rate
for nearby residents.' 6 The NRC has concluded that even if indi-
vidual mills comply with radiation standards, the emissions from
155. Id. at 9.
156. Peshlakai Facts, supra note 31, at 29.
157. Hearings, Mill Tailings Control Act, supra note 106, at 217 (testimony of Joseph
M. Hendrie, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission).
158. Id. at 175 (testimony of Maxi L. Anderson, President, Ranchers Exploration &
Development Co.).
159. Id. at 217 (testimony of Joseph M. Hendrie).
160. Id.
161. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, Draft Environmental Impact Statement on
Uranium Milling, at 6-47 (Apr. 1979) [hereinafter cited as NRC, Uranium Milling DEIS].
162. Hearings, Mill Tailings Control Act, supra note 106, at 400 (testimony of
William D. Rowe, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Radiation Programs, Environmen-
tal Protection Agency).
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nearby mills may result in cumulative exposure of the people in
the area to levels exceeding the maximum approved. 63
For uninformed Indians living near mills, airborne radiation is
not the only threat. Many Indians living near tailings dumps use
the tailings and waste ore from the milling process in the con-
struction of their homes.'6 4 A CBS news crew documenting the
plight of Navajo uranium miners discovered that some Navajo
homes near a mill site emitted more than 100 rems, 20 times the
maximum permissible yearly exposure to gamma radiation estab-
lished by the federal government. 61 In the process of demolishing
an old mill at Shiprock, New Mexico, the mill building itself was
found to be highly radioactive because tailings dust, containing
25% uranium oxide, was sandwiched between two layers of
plywood and had inadvertently been built into the roof.'66
Socioeconomic Impacts
The projected growth of uranium production activities in the
San Juan Basin region in the immediate future presages a mining
boom not unlike the gold rush in California, the Alaskan oil
discoveries, and coal and oil shale development in Wyoming. The
boomtown effects of such massive development are likely to be
even more devastating in this case because most of the projected
growth is "expected to occur on remote Indian lands occupied by
people who live in simple homes without electricity or plumbing,
and who have lived in this traditional way for centuries.'67
Accelerated uranium production in the San Juan area is likely
to have serious adverse impacts on at least three elements of
economic life in the region: employment, housing, and social ser-
vice programs. Considered as a whole, these socioeconomic im-
pacts have been characterized as "the most significant cumulative
effects" of the entire development scheme by the NRC itself. 68
Unemployment and Underemployment
During the last decade, unemployment on Indian reservations
163. NRC, Uranium Milling DEIS, supra note 161, at 4.
164. This story may sound somewhat familiar. A few years ago, it was found that a
school in Grand Junction, Colorado, had been built atop an abandoned tailings dump.
This discovery was made after an abnormally high incidence of leukemia was observed
among children attending that school. Apparently Indians are not the only ones who use
tailings in building construction.
165. Hearings, Health Hazards, supra note 133, at 40-41.
166. Id.
167. Draft San Juan Study, supra note 4, at 1-8 through 1-12.
168. NRC, Uranium Milling DEIS, supra note 161, at 21.
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has been consistently higher than the national average. On the
Navajo Reservation, for example, unemployment has been run-
ning at 30-60% for the last decade.' 69 Resource development has
been viewed as a way to help solve this problem and has provided
energy companies substantial negotiating leverage when dealing
with recalcitrant tribal governments. 170
However, results of preference programs for Indian employees
have demonstrated serious flaws in this planning philosophy.
First, enforcement of such provisions in leasing contracts has
been lackadaisical at best.17 1 If enforcement is not improved in
the future, there is no reason to expect that new mining projects
will actually result in increased Indian employment. Second, even
if the clauses are enforced, only a limited percentage of the
potential Indian labor force can actually be expected to accept
mining-related work. A recent survey conducted for the Navajo
Nation found that mining is not a preferred occupation. In fact,
of those polled, 65% of those employed on-reservation and 82%
of those employed off-reservation said that they would not work
in underground mines.17 1 Currently only 7% of the total Navajo
labor force is employed in energy-related jobs, and of this figure
two-thirds of the Navajo workers actually are employed in the
public sector rather than by the mining companies.' 71 One study
estimated that total Indian employment in the San Juan Basin by
the year 2000 will be 5,000.'17 Yet, according to employment pro-
jections for the area, Indian employees will be outnumbered by
non-Indian employees two or even three to one. 7 5 These projec-
tions of the Indian share of new employment in the uranium in-
169. Henderson, Economic Development and Employment: The Navajo Nation,
Seminar on Indian National Resources Law: Summary of Proceedings, at XIII-6 (rough
draft 1979) [hereinafter cited as Henderson].
170. Id. at XIII-5.
171. In response to this enforcement void, the Navajo Nation established an Office of
Navajo Labor Relations in 1973 which has been generally successful in achieving enforce-
ment of Indian labor preference clauses, although leases entered into prior to 1973 may
escape regulation by this agency. Id. at XIII-8.
172. Meyers, Uranium Industry Labor Market Analysis, San Juan Basin Regional
Uranium Study, Working Paper No. 10, at 7 (May 1, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Draft
San Juan Study, Labor Analysis].
173. Henderson, supra note 169, at XIII-8.
174. Draft San Juan Study, Labor Analysis, supra note 172, at 7.
175. Employment in the region is expected to double, with peak levels at 22,163 to
33,041 employees working in the 72 to 105 new mines expected to become operational be-
tween 1980 and 1985. One-half to three-quarters of these new jobs will most likely go to
non-Indian immigrants to the area; Draft San Juan Study, Labor Analysis, supra note
172, at 32. Draft San Juan Study, Uranium Projections, supra note 7, at 15, 70.
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dustry are consistent with present employment figures for the
area.'
76
Thus, even assuming maximum Indian employment and vigor-
ous enforcement of preference clauses, Indian employees will still
be outnumbered at least two to one in the San Juan Basin
uranium projects.' 77 Additionally, the non-Indian to Indian ratio
may have other negative impacts that will outweigh any tem-
porary Indian employment possibilities. 171
Social Programs and Housing
The effects of rapid growth in uranium production activities on
social programs and housing will be no less severe. The Secretary
of Energy has designated three counties within the San Juan
Basin region (which together comprise all of the area within the
Grants Mineral Belt) as "energy impact areas" under the
Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978.179 Under the
provisions of this Act,' areas meeting the criteria of "energy im-
pact areas" are entitled to federal financial assistance. Two of the
three criteria for designation as energy impact areas concern
shortages of public facilities and housing that are the result of an
8% or greater increase in coal or uranium development-related
employment.' Thus, by definition, the entire Grants Mineral
Belt will suffer serious public services shortages if projected
uranium development occurs.
A study prepared by the state of New Mexico has predicted the
following service-related impacts'8:
1. The economic base of the affected community will become
heavily dependent on the new energy-based projects.
176. Navajo employment in uranium projects on the Navajo Reservation constituted
63% of the total labor force on such projects (387 out of 615). Henderson, supra note
169, at XIII-7 Table 3.
177. According to industry figures, Indian employment in uranium mining activities
in other areas of the country may be higher. Seventy percent of the Spokane Reservation
Sherwood Project work force is Indian, and the Laguna Pueblo operations allegedly
employs an even higher percentage of Indian workers. E & MJ reprint, supra note 12.
178. See text accompanying notes 204-208 infra.
179. 44 Fed. Reg. 48,319, 48,320 (Aug. 12, 1979).
180. Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Title VI, § 601, 92 Stat. 3289
(1978).
181. Id. at § 601(a)(l)(A).
182. Governor's Energy Impact Task Force, State of New Mexico, Managing the
Boom in Northwest New Mexico, at 11-2 (Sept. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Managing the
Boom].
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2. The need for community services and facilities will outstrip
financial and managerial resources.
3. Public facilities like water and sewer systems will not be
able to expand fast enough to meet expected growth.' 3
4. Serious shortages of permanent and mobile housing will
occur.
5. School classroom capacity will become inadequate to handle
additional pupils.
Revenue to meet thse problems will be in short supply. It is
estimated that over the next five years some $244 million will be
required to meet increased capital expenditures in uranium boom-
towns, yet based on current levels of government spending and
state and federal aid, the incorporated communities in north-
western New Mexico will have only $161 million with which to
cover these expenses, a shortage of $83 million.'"
These additional needs cannot be met by either local or state
governments for at least the next five years because these com-
munities are already saddled with the highest property tax rates in
New Mexico and are for the most part bonded to their constitu-
tional limits. Federal assistance likewise may lag behind the pace
of growth. Private industry has resisted providing advance
assistance and may in fact be restricted by the Internal Revenue
Service from providing it.85
Indian tribes will be particularly hard-pressed to meet these in-
creased revenue demands because they receive little return on
state taxes, and are wholly ineligible for federal benefits under
section 601 of the Inland Energy Reserve Development Impact
Assistance Act, enacted in 1979.186 One possible solution is for
tribes to initiate aggressive new taxation schemes to "trap" some
of the capital generated by their lands;8 7 however, private indus-
try may vigorously oppose the imposition of taxes by a third level
of government in addition to state and federal taxes.
183. A recent EPA study reported that the water supply of Crownpoint, New Mexico,
the site of several proposed projects, including Mobil's in situ mining operation, is
already overcommitted. Further demands could push the situation beyond the critical
point. EPA-EDA, Crownpoint Water Supply DEIS, supra note 59, at 16.
184. Managing the Boom, supra note 182, at 11-4, 11-6.
185. Id. at 11-14.
186. Hearings, Health Hazards, supra note 133, at 31.
187. The Navajo Nation enacted an entirely new taxation code in 1978. Title 24,
Navajo Nation Tribal Code, chs. 3, 5 (Supp. 1980). See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980)(en banc), aff'd on other grounds, 102 S.Ct. 804
(1982).
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Housing to accommodate the increased population in uranium
boomtowns likewise presents a formidable problem. A study
completed by the New Mexico State Planning Office has pro-
jected that between $50 million and $145 million in new housing
will be needed in the Grants Mineral Belt alone by the year
1985.88 Because of the boomtown character of growth, housing
loans are likely to be considered high risk by moneylenders. In
other boomtowns, experience has confirmed this prediction.
Finally, as is discussed in Part II, unless the Indian tribes af-
fected by uranium development acquire a long-term interest in
the exploitation of their own resources-something beyond mere
passive receipt of royalties-uranium development will result in a
net outflow of value from the reservations. Indian tribes will re-
main dependent on the "center" for capital, expertise, and social
programs and will reap only meager profits from their resources,
while outside interests benefit from favorable tax treatment and
massive value-added profits.'8 9
Sociocultural Impacts
The sociocultural impacts of the birth of a boomtown in an
isolated area inhabited by shepherds will be enormous. Rapid
population increase and explosive growth in commercial activities
can be expected to affect local Indian populations in the follow-
ing ways: (1) erosion of traditional livelihoods and religion; and
(2) increased friction between Indian and non-Indian residents of
the area.
Uranium extraction and processing involve horrendous impacts
on the natural environment, as described earlier. To Navajos and
to other tribes who consider themselves to be an integral part of
nature, this disruption of sacred sites is the worst sort of
blasphemy. One Indian plaintiff in the Peshlakai suit expressed
his beliefs as follows:
I feel that the earth is very powerful and that it has a spirit just
like we do. The job of the earth has been from the very begin-
ning to take care of mankind. But in return, mankind must
treat the earth with respect.
By mining uranium the outsiders are attacking the very heart
of the earth. They are upsetting the balance of the earth by
-88. N.M. State Planning Office, The Grants Uranium Belt, at 31.
189. See text accompanying notes 269-271.
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blasting and digging and removing what is under the ground.
The results of this will be very bad for us all.' 90
Uranium exploration activities have already disturbed some
85,000 acres of land in the San Juan area alone,' 9' resulting in the
destruction of forage for livestock, the obliteration of natural
sites held sacred by the Navajo, and the destruction of native
plants Navajos use in their religious ceremonies.' 91 This callous
disregard for the religious sensitivities of another society has been
most fittingly described by a Navajo plaintiff in the. Peshlakai
suit:
The drillers did not ask us where our sacred sites were before
they began doing their work. No efforts were made to deter-
mine which areas were sacred to us and to protect them even
though these people must have known that Navajos have a
special relationship to the land and would have such [sacred]
areas.
Now that these places are destroyed it will not be easy for us
to find other places for our ceremonies. We cannot just go and
choose one. These places are traditional and have been selected
through much prayer by many of our fathers and grandfathers.
I do not know when we will find areas which we can use as we
used these. 93
Another Navajo plaintiff in the Peshlakai suit has put this wan-
ton destruction of sacred natural sites and healing plants in a
white person's context: "It is as if we went about destroying the
churches and Bibles and altars and other holy places and artifacts
of the white man's religion." 94
The importance of preserving Indian religious sites was ex-
plicitly recognized by the passage of a joint resolution entitled
"American Indian Religious Freedom Act" in 1978.' 9 One of the
primary interferences with the free exercise of native religions
identified by Congress was denial of access to physical locations
that are sacred to Indians. ,9 6 The Act directs executive agencies to
190. Affidavit of Ernest Thompson, Peshlakai Facts, supra note 31, at 15.
191. Peshlakai Points and Authorities, supra note 15, at 52.
192. Affidavit of Walter Peshlakai, Peshlakai Facts, supra note 31, at 15-17.
193. Id.
194. Affidavit of Hah-no-bah Charley, Peshlakai Facts, supra note 31, at 17.
195. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (Supp. 1980).
196. H.R. REP. No. 1308, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
1262-66.
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review their programs and activities to ensure that violations are
corrected promptly and to assure that the agencies take into ac-
count the religious practices of Native Americans who may be af-
fected by their operations. In response to this directive the
Department of the Interior agreed that, before it proceeds with a
proposed action, it will: (1) investigate to determine if a religious
site will be affected; (2) if a site will be affected, consult with
Native American traditional leaders to determine if the action
would infringe upon religious freedom of their group; (3) if in-
fringement is likely, prepare alternate plans that avoid infringe-
ment, and (4) if avoidance is not feasible, weigh the potential im-
pacts against the importance of the project.' 97 The report submit-
ted to Congress by the BIA acknowledged that it was aware of
complaints concerning infringement of religious freedom as a
result of uranium mining in the San Juan Basin.' Despite the
directives of the statute and documented proof that some Indians
object to the interferences of uranium development acitivities
with the exercise of their religion, no environmental impact state-
ment investigating the impacts of such activities on Indian
religious practices in the San Juan Basin area had been prepared
as of the summer of 1979.' 99
An even more tangible example of the erosion of traditional
Indian culture because of uranium development is the destruction
of forage and contamination of water used for livestock, the
economic mainstay of the Navajo way of life. Grazing animals
are not only the major asset of most Navajo extended families
but are also the basic element of support for most of them. " '
Yellowcake production in the area has already inflicted serious
harm to some Navajos' livestock: mine discharge water con-
taminated with toxic metals and radioactive substances has
poisoned sheep, cows, and goats that have drunk it,20 ' and con-
struction of exploration roads and drill holes has destroyed
already overgrazed forage areas. 02 As the pace of development
accelerates, these impacts can be expected to intensify.
In addition to disturbances created within traditional Navajo
culture, massive uranium development is expected to cause
197. U.S. Dep't of Interior, Report to Congress on the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act of 1978, Peshlakai Points and Authorities, supra note 15, at 14.
198. Id. at app. C.
199. See text accompanying notes 256-257.
200. Navajo-Exxon EIS, supra note 35, at 11-130.
201. Affidavit of Leo Martin, Peshlakai Facts, supra note 31, at 17.
202. Peshlakai Facts, supra note 31, at 17.
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substantial conflict between Indian residents and non-Indian im-
migrants into the areas affected by development. The explosive
growth of the population in the San Juan Basin area-at least a
doubling of the present figures by the year 2000 203 -will be caused
primarily by an influx of non-Indian workers into the area. The
Department of the Interior has already acknowledged the probable
impact of such an imbalanced racial composition in areas of
northwestern New Mexico affected by coal development, a situa-
tion analogous to uranium frontiers204:
In-migration of urban Anglos from outside New Mexico would
increase the minority status of the native Hispanos and In-
dians. Different values and objectives between long-time Anglo
inhabitants and newcomers, and between Anglos, Hispanos
and Indians would result in increased conflicts.
Hispanos and Indians would encounter growing social and
economic pressure to conform to Anglo values and lifestyles.
Adverse impacts on the well-being of individuals, including
disorderly conduct, alcoholism and psychological distress
would be likely to result, particularly in the border towns of
Farmington and Gallup .... 205
Past experience with boomtown environments has confirmed the
social disruption that accompanies such massive, sudden growth:
Attempted suicide, divorce, truancy, crime, child beating, and
alcoholism have all been observed to rise dramatically in such
boomtowns as Rock Springs and Gillette, Wyoming and Craig,
Colorado .... In such an environment, the first issue of life in
a boomtown becomes, as one study concluded, simply human
survival at a level above mere existence. 20 6
The impact of this cultural shock on fragile, traditional Indian
life-styles would be devastating. The primary danger would be
created from the clash of traditional values with new, imported
values, reflected in a polarization of the Indian community be-
tween the new class of wage-earners and the traditional pastoral
community. 0 7 The EIS for one western energy development pro-
ject predicted the results of that development as follows:
203. Draft San Juan Study, Uranium Projections, supra note 7, at 15, 70.
204. EIS, Star Lake-Bisti, supra note 5, at V-I.
205. Id.
206. Id. at IV-66.
207. This polarization was earlier predicted by Ruffing in her study of the impacts of
uranium development on Navajo society. Ruffing, the Navajo Nation: A History of
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All of these changes would impact upon the tenacity with
which these Navajo people cling to traditional lifestyles and
sooner or later erosion of some traditional beliefs would set in.
The shift may be slow but innovation would eventually change
the ways in which these traditional Navajos live their lives.
The result of these changes would be characterized by family
conflict, the abandonment of traditional economic activities,
frustration with new and culturally unacceptable surroundings
and some inability to cope with a strange environment. In some
instances families may disintegrate and for some who cannot
cope with the impact of change retreat into emotional instability
or alcoholism may result. 08
Although these predictions were made for coal development,
uranium development portends the same social upheaval given
the rapid rise in population, the increased and partially unmet
demands for public services and facilities, the disparity between
cost of living and income levels, and the influx of a non-Indian
transient population into a relatively small area.20 9 If uranium
development exceeds the projected "moderate" level, the impacts
could be even more severe.
II. Indian Control of Indian Uranium: The Myth and the Reality
Given the massive effects on Indian lands, society, and health,
one might wonder why it is that organized Indian opposition to
uranium resource development has not been stiffer. In fact, op-
position has been noticeable, but for the most part it has also
been limited to isolated manifestations of resistance, such as the
Peshlakai lawsuit and internal tribal actions.210 Indians who ob-
Dependence and Underdevelopment, at 59 (first draft 1978) [hereinafter cited as Ruffing].
208. U.S. Dep't of Interior, Final Environmental Impact Statement, Proposed
Western Gasification Company (WESCO) Coal Gasification Project and Expansion of
Navajo Mine by Utah International, Inc., San Juan County, New Mexico, at 3-210
through 3-216.
209. Draft San Juan Study, supra note 4, at V-46, VI-14.
210. The Peshlakai suit was brought by a number of Navajo Indians who live near the
Mobil Oil in situ uranium mining project outside of Crownpoint and who opposed the in-
itiation of that project. Chapters-local governmental bodies whose representatives sit on
the Navajo Tribal Council-directly affected by uranium exploration and development on
the Navajo Reservation have been voicing strong opposition to such activities since 1978.
For instance, since 1978 four chapters (Shiprock, Crownpoint, Dalton Pass, and Canon-
cito) have taken issue with the Navajo tribal government's "bullish" resource develop-
ment stance.
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ject to the rapid development of uranium deposits and the con-
comitant deterioration in the physical and social environments of
their lands find themselves confronted by a mountain of govern-
mental and legal obstacles. Some of these obstacles are the result
of federal government Indian policy, some are caused by eco-
nomic forces, and some have their roots in tribal politics.
Whatever their cause, these barriers impose serious constraints on
Indian people in the San Juan Basin and elsewhere striving to ex-
ercise control over their own futures. This section will examine
the causes and effects of those limitations.
Indian Leasing Policies: A Political and Economic Straitjacket
At the root of the Indians' inability to manage their own
resources lies the infrastructure of federal constitutional restric-
tions, statutes, and regulations that govern the legal relationships
of Indians with the non-Indian world.
The basic tenet of federal Indian policy is now and has been
since the early 1800s that Indian tribes are sovereign na-
tions-sort of. Thus, although tribes have an absolute right to oc-
cupancy of the lands reserved to them by treaty, act of Congress,
or executive order, 21' the fee title to such tribal lands and the
underlying mineral estates is held in trust by the federal govern-
ment.212 This legal relationship has had definite political and
economic consequences for tribes intent on exercising their
sovereignty over their lands and minerals. Principal among such
effects are:
1. Lands and the accompanying mineral rights held in trust
for tribes by the federal government are subject to a general
restriction against alienation.21 3 By analogy, lands held in trust by
the federal government for individual Indians holding trust
patents on allotted parcels2 '" have likewise by and large been
211. Lavell & Black, Indian Land Status, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FDN. INST. ON INDIAN
LAND DEVELOPMENT: OIL, GAS, COAL AND OTHER MINERALS 5-3 (1976).
212. F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW ch. 15 (1942).
213. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1976) states: "No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyances
of lands or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall
be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention
entered into pursuant to the Constitution."
214. Under the General Allotment Act of 1887, 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-34, 339, 341-42,
348-49, 381 (1976), and other allotment acts applicable by their terms to specific tribes,
individual Indians could acquire a patent in a plot of land for their own use, subject to
retention of the fee by the United States government in trust for such individuals. Upon
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made subject to a similar restraint.2"5 Since Indians do not con-
trol the fee to the vast majority of their lands,2" 6 land-use policies
for Indian property becomes more a matter of federal prerogative
than of Indian choice. Theoretically, the range of acceptable uses
is limited by the federal government's fiduciary duty as trustee
for its Indian beneficiaries; however, given the often competing
goals of Indian preferences and federal land-use policy, the trust
relationship still frequently takes a back seat to "national
priorities." 2'7 With the heightened pressure on resource owners
to develop their holdings in order to ease the energy crisis, tribes
are likely to confront a government ever more hostile to exercis-
ing wise fiduciary discretion in supervising Indian resource
development, if the latter translates into "preservation" rather
than exploitation.
2. The favored-indeed, until very recently, the only-means
adopted by the federal government to authorize non-Indian
development of Indian lands and resources has been leasing.21 8
expiration of a 25-year period of restriction during which the United States held fee title
to the land, the Indian patentees could obtain a fee patent to the land, free of all trust
restrictions. The allotment program was formally closed in 1934 with the enactment of the
Indian Reorganization Act, which also extended the period of trust restrictions on trust
patents indefinitely, in response to widespread abuses of the allotment system by
unscrupulous white landowners and unsympathetic government agents.
215. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1976).
216. Allotments under trust patent and reservation lands constitute the bulk of most
tribes' land areas, although some tribes (notably the Navajo) have in recent years pur-
chased lands in fee from the United States and private landowners contiguous to their
own, which had been lost by sale to non-Indians. The Pueblo Indians present something
of an anomaly; they hold their lands in fee simple but are still subject to the mineral leas-
ing statutes and regulations applicable to Indian land in general.
217. The United States Department of the Interior encompasses, in addition to the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the United States Geological Survey (USGS), the Bureau
of Mines, the Bureau of Land Management, and the Forest Service, all of which may at
times have priorities diametrically opposed to Indian interest. See, e.g., Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973). Beyond this, other
federal departments are equally, if not more, likely to advocate certain positions contrary
to those favored by the government's Indian "wards." For instance, Interior may find
itself doing battle against the United States Department of Energy, or its child, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
218. Authority for leasing tribal mineral interests is contained in a number of federal
statutes. Preeminent among these are: (a) the Indian Reoganization Act of 1934, 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-80 (1976), (b) the Omnibus Tribal Leasing Act of 1938, 25 U.S.C. §§
396a-396g (1976), (c) various statutes authorizing leasing for mining or other purposes,
e.g., the Act of Feb. 28, 1891, 25 U.S.C. § 397, authorizing the mining of surplus
agricultural lands "bought and paid for" by Indians; the Act of June 30, 1919, 41 Stat.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol9/iss1/2
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After nearly fifty years of experience with the present federal
leasing scheme, tribes increasingly find that it is an anachronistic,
unfairly restrictive system that tends to maximize the non-Indian
lessees' profits at the Indian lessors' expense. A few examples
should help illustrate this contention.
(a) Under the regulations promulgated pursuant to authority
granted the Department of the Interior under the various leasing
statutes,"1 9 any lease of Indian mineral rights requires the ap-
proval of the Secretary of the Interior before it will be considered
valid. Tribes may vary the lease negotiation process only if the
Secretary approves such action in writing in advance. Even if a
tribe then successfully negotiates a lease that both the Indian
lessor and the non-Indian lessee find wholly acceptable, the
Secretary has an absolute veto power over such an agreement and
can order the negotiated agreement to be rejected and the tradi-
tional advertised bid process reinstated. 10
The disadvantages such a procedure has for tribes seeking to
maximize their control over tribal resources are exemplified in the
fate of the recently approved Exxon lease of some 625 square
miles of Navajo land for uranium exploration. In January of
1973 the Navajos sent out 25 invitations for bids on uranium ex-
ploration. A year later they had determined that Exxon had made
the best offer and entered into an agreement with that company
which would provide that the Navajos could either take royalties
ranging from 12-25% of the value of any ore found or could ac-
quire a working interest of up to 49% in the project. The Navajos
submitted the agreement for secretarial approval. Because the
regulations required competitive bidding, however (despite the
fact that almost half of prior competitive auctions had received
1231, and the Act of Dec. 16, 1976, 25 U.S.C. § 399, both of which authorized the leasing
of unallotted lands "opened" by the Secretary which were withdrawn from entry under
the general mining laws prior to June 30, 1919, for mining purposes only; the Act of Apr.
17, 1926, 25 U.S.C. § 400a, which authorized leasing for mining purposes of lands on In-
dian reservations reserved for Indian agencies or schools; and other acts applicable by
their terms to leases for oil and gas only. Authority for leasing individually owned Indian
land is found at 25 U.S.C. §§ 396, 403.
219. Id.; 25 C.F.R. §§ 171-72 (1980). Leasing regulations that apply to certain tribes
in particular are found at 25 C.F.R. §§ 173-76, 178-79 (1980). A number of other parts in
the 170 and 180 series deal with certain types of leases and reclamation procedures. Pro-
posals for revising most of these regulations were submitted to the Secretary of the In-
terior in 1977. 42 Fed. Reg. 18,083 (1977). These amendments have not yet been approved
by the United States Department of the Interior.
220. 25 C.F.R. § 171.2 (1981).
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only one bid), the BIA Area Office refused to approve the
lease.22'
Further delay resulted when, in April of 1974, the Commis-
sioner requested that an environmental impact statement be
prepared. This study was not even started until January, 1976.
The lease was not finally approved until January of 1977, three
years after Exxon and the Navajo Nation had entered their
original agreement. Navajo Mineral Department officials claim
that as a result of the delay (which some consider to have been
caused by the BIA Area Office's pique at having been excluded
from preliminary negotiations 222), the Navajo Nation lost more
than a million dollars in interest on a bonus Exxon had promised
to pay upon approval of the agreement. 223
(b) Under the terms of 25 C.F.R. § 171.6, the Secretary is the
party authorized to set bonding rates and is given absolute discre-
tion in determining whether a lesser bond will fully protect the in-
terests of the Indian mineral holder. 22 The bond requested by the
BIA for the leasing of the world's largest open-pit uranium mine,
the Jackpile-Paguate Mine on Laguna Pueblo lands, was only
$10,000, a sum that "would not have covered 100 square
feet. ' 2 5 Upon being prodded by the Laguna Pueblo governor,
the USGS raised the bond to $100,000, still woefully
inadequate. 26 Eventually, the bond was raised to $10 million un-
til final reclamation plans are settled. 227
(c) The regulations set fixed royalty rates which, in today's
energy-hungry market, are absurdly low. 228 In 1977, for example,
Navajo lessors received only about 8% of the total revenue from
the sale of uranium mined on the Navajo Reservation. 2 9 Low
221. AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, TASK FORCE No.
7: REPORT ON RESERVATION AND RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND PROTECTION app. I at 140
(1976) [hereinafter cited as AIPRC FINAL REPORT, app.]
222. Ruffing, supra note 207, at 37.
223. Id.
224. 25 C.F.R. § 171.6 (1981).
225. Correa, The Tribal Role in Labor Disputes and Other Resources Conflicts,
Seminar on Indian Natural Resources Law: Summary of Proceedings, at XIII-27 (rough
draft 1979) [hereinafter cited as Correa].
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. The applicable sections are 25 C.F.R. § 171.12 (1981) (advance royalties), 25
C.F.R. § 171.14 (1981) (minimum development expenditures), and 25 C.F.R. § 171.15
(1.981) (royalty rates).
229. This amounted to only $744,038 out of a total of $9,770,019. Henderson, supra
note 169, at XIII-3.
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royalty rates are especially prevalent in Indian uranium leases
because of the evolution of the uranium industry in this country
from government monopoly to private, regulated industry."'0
(d) In addition to being ridiculously low, royalties are not
paid to the Indian lessors directly, but to the Superintendent of
the local reservation (Area Office), or to the Supervisor of the
USGS. 23' Needless to say, in the typical paper shuffle of a govern-
ment agency, payments allegedly made may mysteriously dema-
terialize: in 1974 the Auditor General of the Navajo Nation in-
vestigated the USGS in Roswell, New Mexico, and discoyered that
various companies were in arrears. 232 A few years later, the Pueblo
of Laguna hired an auditor-over the objections of the Depart-
ment of the Interior-who found a number of underpayments on
the part of the Anaconda Company for its Jackpile-Paguate
operations.233
Beyond these specific examples of lease provisions gone awry,
the leasing system as a whole tends to hamstring the in-
dependence of tribes' decision making, which in turn serves to
undermine their bargaining strength vis-a-vis powerful energy
corporations.2 4 The tribes' weak bargaining position is exacer-
bated by several other factors, both social and economic, over
which tribes historically have had little control. Primary among
such factors are:
1. the paucity of scientific research and statistical informa-
230. From 1942 to 1966, uranium production in the United States was a government
monopoly under the now-defunct Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). Uranium mills
operated only with the approval of the AEC; the AEC set purchase prices; and the AEC
was the sole buyer of all uranium oxide produced. Alfers, The Uranium Royalty Today,
25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FDN. INST., 19-1, 19-6 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Alfers]. The
simplicity of the royalty provisions for uranium oxide that were developed was a direct
consequence of the simple market situation under the AEC monopoly. Id. at 19-8. Under
the Atomic Energy Commission's "Circular 5," a fixed price royalty arrangement was
adopted by the uranium industry which was based on the contained UO, in a given
volume of ore. Peterson, The Uranium Royalty Provision: Its Evolution, Present Com-
plexity, and Future Uncertainty, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FDN. URANIUM EXPLORATION AND
DEVELOPMENT INST. 4-1 (1976). Even after the termination of the AEC monopoly in the
mid-1960s this simple fixed royalty provision continued to be used in the industry, despite
rapid changes in the uranium market and industry recognition of the inadequacies of con-
temporary royalty calculations. Id. at 4-3 to 4-6; Alfers, supra at 19-2 to 19-3.
231. 25 C.F.R. § 171.12 (1981).
232. Ruffing, supra note 207, at 36.
233. Correa, supra note 225, at XIII-28
234. The American Indian Policy Review Commission Final Report was perhaps the
first major study to identify this problem. AIPRC FINAL REPORT, app., supra note 221.
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tion that is available to tribes embarking on resource manage-
ment planning;
2. strictly limited tribal financial resources;
3. a lack of taxing and regulatory power over non-Indian
enterprises on Indian lands;
4. the lack of consistent enforcement of contract clauses by
the United States government in its capacity as tribal trustee; and
5. the sometimes acrimonious debates among members of
tribes concerning the advisability of resource exploitation. These
factors are explored at some length in the following pages.
1. Lack of Access to Information
It is axiomatic in contract law that for an agreement to be en-
forceable it must represent the result of a bargain undertaken by
two parties fully informed of the terms of that bargain and aware
of its consequences. Unfortunately, until very recently, rarely did
a tribe entering a mineral leasing agreement have sufficient infor-
mation to appraise the situation accurately and make a truly in-
formed decision. In theory, the federal government as trustee is
responsible for tribes having enough information about a pro-
posal to be able to make decisions in their own best interests. In
practice, neither the USGS nor the BIA has ever undertaken a
comprehensive inventory of Indian resource reserves to provide
tribes with a basis for their decisions. 21" Tribes who have needed
such information before sitting down at the negotiating table with
powerful corporations have been forced to obtain as much infor-
mation as they could with limited tribal financial resources."'
Corporations have been reluctant to share information gained
from extensive exploration with tribes, fearing that they could
back out of pending negotiations and leave a company with
nothing more than the bill for exploration costs. 237 Even the
235. The United States Department of Energy and four other federal departments and
agencies have recently made $24 million available to the Council of Energy Resource
Tribes. Part of this funding will be used to conduct an extensive resource inventory of all
tribal lands. The BIA and USGS are to provide at least $7 million for this project. E &
MJ reprint, supra note 12.
236. For example, the Navajos contracted a study of potential oil and gas reserves on
their lands a few years ago. Ruffing, supra note 207, at 34. The Northern Cheyenne in-
stituted a comprehensive evaluation of their coal reserves and potential impacts from their
development in 1973. Monteau, Potential for Indian Natural Resource Development, pt.
I, Seminar on Indian Natural Resources Law: Summary of Proceedings, at I1-1 to 11-3
(rough draft, 1979).
237. Ferguson, Industry Problems with the Emerging Tribal Role, ROCKY MTN. MIN.
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federal government has seemingly discouraged a free flow of in-
formation among tribes with resources: for instance, when the
Navajo Nation suggested in 1978 that a procedure for exchanging
information with other BIA personnel conducting mineral
negotiations be established, its proposal was actively opposed by
the BIA Washington Office because tribes might use such infor-
mation without giving due consideration to local conditions, and
"it would be difficult and expensive to establish such a
system." ' 238 At the time, the BIA Navajo Area Office did not
even employ a mining engineer or geologist.239
However, the future looks brighter. In 1975 twenty-five tribes
possessing substantial mineral resources formed the Council of
Energy Resource Tribes (CERT) to assist tribes in developing
their management capabilities for resource development and pro-
tection. 240 Since that time, CERT has successfully lobbied the
federal government for more than $20 million for a variety of
assistance programs, which include conducting a comprehensive
resource inventory of all Indian lands,2 ' providing $10 million in
loan guarantee funds, funding three CERT pilot feasibility energy
projects on Indian lands, and assisting in the establishment of an
information storage and distribution center in Denver,
Colorado. 242 CERT also helps tribes on an individual basis to
compile information on -particular projects and prepare analyses
of the impacts of energy development on local Indian popula-
tions.
Indian tribes also have been establishing their own internal
departments to deal with resource development. For example, the
L. FDN. INST. ON INDIAN LAND DEVELOPMENT: OIL, GAS, COAL AND OTHER MINERALS
11-12 (1976). Such disingenuity could be precluded simply by inserting a confidentiality
clause in the exploration contract, or by otherwise assuring the company that it would
have first right to use its own information. Lipton, Problems in Negotiating Indian
Mineral Agreements, Seminar on Indian Natural Resources Law: Summary of Pro-
ceedings, at IV-9 (rough draft 1979) [hereinafter cited as Lipton].
238. Ruffing, supra note 207, at 33.
239. Id.
240. Fifteen of those tribes have been identified as having known of potential
uranium reserves. They are: Acoma Pueblo, Cheyenne River Sioux, Colville, Hopi, Jemez
Pueblo, Jicarilla Apache, Laguna Pueblo, Navajo, Santa Ana Pueblo, Southern Ute,
Spokane, Uintah-Ouray, Ute Mountain, Wind River, and Zia Pueblo. Of these fifteen,
three (the Navajo, Spokane, and Laguna Pueblo) presently have uranium production
facilities in operation and two-thirds of these are located within the general Southwest-
San Juan Basin region. E & MJ reprint, supra note 12.
241. See AIPRC FINAL REPORT, app., supra note 221.
242. E & MJ reprint, supra note 12.
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Navajo Nation has professionally staffed tribal offices to deal
with mineral development, employment preferences, economic
planning, and environmental protection (among others). The tribal
government of Laguna Pueblo assumed an active role in compel-
ling negotiations between labor and management when confronted
with a possible strike at the Jackpile-Paguate uranium mine in
1977.243
Finally, the federal government itself has been making money
available to tribes to strengthen their control over resource de-
velopment through programs and agencies such as the BIA Re-
volving Loan Fund, the Economic Development Administration,
the Office of Minority Business Enterprise, the Small Business
Administration, and the now-defunct CETA program. 44 The
fate of these funds under the Reagan Administration, however, is
at best dubious. Proposed new regulations for Indian mineral
leasing procedures include a number of specific provisions requir-
ing the :BIA and USGS to provide information and technical assis-
tance to Indian tribes and individuals engaged in resource negotia-
tions, 245 but these regulations have been awaiting approval for
four years and it is improbable that they will now be adopted
under James Watts's term of office as Secretary of the Interior.
2. Limited Financial Resources
Tribes are heavily dependent on revenue from resource
development. For example, in 1975 mineral leasing accounted for
70% of the Navajos' total tribal revenue. 246 The Jackpile-Paguate
243. Correa, supra note 225, at XIII-24 through XIII-28.
244. Ryan, Introduction to Federal Agencies and Programs Dealing with Indian
Natural Resource Development, Seminar on Indian Natural Resources Law: Summary of
Proceedings, at XV-i through XV-iii (rough draft, 1979).
245. 42 Fed. Reg. 18,083 (Apr. 5, 1977). For example, section 171.3(b) mandates that
the BIA Area Director, USGS Mining Supervisor, and any other appropriate federal
agencies such as the Bureau of Mines shall provide any "technical or other advice or
assistance regarding development of Indian-owned minerals" requested by tribal or in-
dividual Indian mineral owners. Section 171.4 requires the operator to submit "written
evidence ... that minerals are being produced in paying quantities" at the expiration of
the principal lease term and at the end of each fiscal year thereafter until the expiration of
the contract. Section 171.6 requires that a written economic assessment of the proposed
contract be provided the Indian mineral owner in all cases whether or not requested. Sec-
tion 171.9(b) specifies that the BIA Area Director must provide tribal mineral owners,
and must provide individual Indian mineral owners, all information and determinations
made by the USGS Mining Supervisor concerning the minerals covered by the contract or
their development.
246. Ruffing, supra note 207, at 66, table 4.
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Mine on the Laguna Pueblo Reservation probably supplies a
similar percentage of that tribe's finances. As a result, tribes are
sometimes hesitant to take a hard line with energy corporations
when to do so would jeopardize the flow of revenue from re-
source operations. The corporate negotiators know this and can
often force a tribe's hand by offering enticing short-term, quick
payoff provisions (such as bonuses) instead of long-term, low-
return arrangements that would provide more revenue over the
long run. 247 Internal pressure from tribal members to make deals
may also influence tribal negotiators. 248
As explained in the foregoing section, tribes are acquiring more
and better information about exactly what it is that they are bar-
gaining for, and the federal government has been making more
money available to them to strengthen their economies. These
factors should help assure that a shortage of revenue will not be
the sole justification for entering mineral development agree-
ments.
3. Lack of Taxing and Regulatory Authority
Tribes are "third in line" after the federal and state govern-
ments, both for taxation and regulatory purposes. 249 State taxes
are particularly burdensome for Indian mineral holders, not only
because of the high rates for severance taxes but in some cases
because none of this state revenue makes its way back onto the
reservation where it originated. 250 Federal taxation is also
devastating: although the development corporations are able to
benefit from such federal tax benefits as the investment tax
credit, accelerated depreciation, the depletion allowance, and par-
tially tax-exempt intangible drilling and development costs (IDC),
no tribe appears to be taking advantage of such benefits, which
may add up to 25% of the value of the minerals produced. 2 1 In
fact, the taxes the federal and state governments take out often
exceed the total wages, rents, and royalty payments received by a
tribe under a mineral lease. For instance, Arizona property taxes
247. Lipton, supra note 247, at IV-17 through IV-18.
248. Id.
249. AIPRC FINAL REPORT, app., supra note 221, at 140.
250. Lipton, supra note 237, at IV-13, cites as an example the Montana severance tax
on coal. At 30%, it is the highest tax of its kind in the world. Furthermore, Montana does
not classify tribal governments as local governments; therefore, tribes do not receive any
of the revenue generated from mining of resources on their own lands.
251. Id. at IV-13 through IV-14.
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paid by coal producers on reservation lands for one project in
1975 (the Black Mesa Pipeline) amounted to more than $1
million. Navajo wages, royalties, rents, bonuses, and rights of
way on the other hand totaled only $239,000.22
When a tribe has attempted to exercise taxing authority, it has
been met by stiff resistance from developers. This resistance may
take the form of clauses in contracts requiring the tribe to waive
its right to levy any taxes or open court challenges to the tribe's
jurisdiction.253 In the face of this resistance, tribes may consider
as an alternative to taxation the renegotiation of their now-
inequitable contracts so that they can recoup part of their lost
revenues. However, these efforts have likewise been largely un-
successful for many of the same reasons that make initial negotia-
tions so difficult. The situation might be ameliorated somewhat if
the Secretary would exercise his power as trustee and cancel leases
that are plainly unfair to the tribes.2""
Despite a plethora of statutes and regulations designed to pro-
tect the natural environment in the face of development, it is
clear that presently neither federal nor state agencies are enforc-
ing environmental protection laws in the San Juan Basin (nor in
other Indian territories afflicted with rapid development). Only
four environmental impact statements have been prepared to date
out of more than forty actions involving potentially significant
impacts on the environment.2 55 Because of the magnitude of the
development predicted for the San Juan Basin, several agencies
have recommended that a regional EIS be prepared prior to any
further uranium development activities. 26 The Peshlakai suit
252. Ruffing, supra note 207, at 65.
253. Henderson, supra note 169, at XIII-6.
254. This was what happened when Secretary Kleppe cancelled the Crow and
Northern Cheyenne coal leases in 1973-74.
255. Such actions include: (a) the execution of a lease sale offering almost 90,000
acres of Navajo allotted lands underlying Mobil's proposed in situ project in 1972,
Peshlakai Facts, supra note 31, at 1; (b) the sale of a lease to approximately 29,000 acres
of this land, id.; (c) the preparation and approval by the United States Department of the
Interior of exploration plans for Mobil's in situ project; id.; (d) the approval of Mobil's
mining and reclamation plans for the project, id. at 3; (e) the review of pending applica-
tions submitted by various uranium mining companies, including eight mining and
reclamation plans, forty-four uranium prospecting permits, nine patent applications for
uranium claims, six National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Systems (NPDES) water
discharge permits, and one right-of-way application, id. at 11. All of these proposed ac-
tivities are located within the San Juan Basin and the majority are on Indian or federal
lands.
256. The following agencies and individuals have recommended that a regional en-
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sought the same end, but its prayer for a regional EIS on
uranium development in the San Juan Basin area was denied.
Despite these demands, no such study has yet been undertaken,
leading one commentator to observe: "The regulatory network
that exists in the San Juan Uranium Basin to govern health and
environmental impacts of uranium development is not effective.
Much of the industry's activity is left unregulated, and it is the
case that in fact no one knows what is happening in the San Juan
Uranium Basin." 27
Faced with this enforcement vacuum, some tribes have attemp-
ted to institute their own environmental, cultural, and economic
regulations. For example, the Navajo Nation has established a
tribal Environmental Protection Commission with the authority
to issue and enforce rules and regulations, to issue cease and
desist orders, to levy fines, and to undertake environmental
studies .25  The commission has also served as an able liaison with
Washington during congressional hearings on topics concerning
uranium development. In 1973 the Navajo Office of Energy Re-
sources was formed with stated objectives to evaluate mineral re-
sources and development potential, to monitor mineral produc-
tion from Navajo lands, and to encourage innovative licensing
arrangements with energy corporations. 2 ' Finally, an entire
chapter of the Navajo Tribal Code is devoted to provisions ensur-
ing safe mine working conditions. 60
As might be expected, corporate resistance to the assertion of
tribal regulatory authority has been stiff. At times resistance may
take the form of clauses in lease contracts requiring the tribe to
suspend its legislative and regulatory authority over company
activities on the reservation and, at other times, as open court
challenges to the assertion of tribal regulatory authority.
Although the law is far from settled as to the extent of tribal
regulatory authority over non-Indian activities on the reservation,
vironmental impact report be prepared: officials from the Southwest Region of the
Department of the Interior, the Office of Environmental Policy Review of the Deparment
of the Interior, the USGS Conservation Manager of the Central Region, the Environmen-
tal Section of the USGS and the Draft San Juan Study prepared by the Department of the
Interior. Peshlakal Points and Authorities, supra note 15, at 42-47.
257. Sorenson & Marston, Uranium Mining and Milling and Environmental Protec-
tion: Mitigation of Regulatory Problems, San Juan Basin Regional Uranium Study,
Working Paper No. 35, at 58 (1978).
258. Navajo Tribal Code §§ 3401, 3404 (1977).
259. Navajo Tribal Code § 202 (1977).
260. Id., ch. 5, §§ 401-409.
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what law there is and modern federal Indian policies suggest that
tribes may have substantial authority in this area-if they dare ex-
ercise it. 261
4. Lack of Contract Enforcement by the Federal Government
As trustee for the tribes, the federal government has the
ultimate responsibility for making sure corporate contractors are
adhering to the terms of their agreements with Indian tribes.
However, even were the federal government astute in bringing
such actions to protect its Indian beneficiaries' interests, which it
is not, most of the contract clauses in present federal lease forms
are so vague as to be unenforceable in court.262 The lack of en-
sured enforcement makes it difficult for tribes to use the tactic of
threatening to insert protective clauses in leases in order to gain
concessions from the corporations. 63
5. Lack of Tribal Consensus
The social and cultural traditions of almost all North American
Indian tribes emphasize the importance of community decision
making. However, as in any representative government, tribal
representatives may not always reflect the views of all their con-
stituents, especially in populous tribes like the Navajo. Many
traditional Indian people and an increasing number of young ac-
tivists are deeply concerned about the irreversible impacts
uranium mining will have on their life-styles and livelihoods. 264
There is even concern among the members of some tribes who
will be most directly affected by uranium production that their
own governments are simply not acting in their best interests.265
Such internal dissension can be used by companies to their advan-
tage, fo: example, by selectively releasing information concerning
261. See, e.g., Will, Indian Lands Environment-Who Should Protect It? 18 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 465 (1978); Israel, The Reemergence of Tribal Nationalism, ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. FDN. INST. ON INDIAN LAND DEVELOPMENT: OIL, GAS, COAL AND OTHER
MINERALS 10-24 to 10-40 (1976).
262. Ruffing, supra note 207, at 32.
263. AIPRC FINAL REPORT, app., supra note 221, at 140.
264. Ruffing, supra note 207, at 39.
265. For example, according to the investigation of one group, despite the unqualified
opposition of the Shiprock Chapter of the Navajo Nation, the tribal council proceeded
with its agreement with Exxon to lease 625 square miles (400,000 acres) of Navajo land ly-
ing largely within the Shiprock Chapter's area. Other chapters whose lands lie within the
uranium belt have likewise expressed their opposition to uranium development, for ex-
ample, the Dalton Pass Chapter in 1978 and the Crownpoint Chapter in 1980.
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pending negotiations in order to channel internal political discus-
sion among tribal members. 266 At the very least, the positions of
tribal negotiators are seriously compromised because they may
subsequently be subject to attack from their own people. 67
Tribes also face pressure from the BIA and the corporations to
make quick deals, even if such arrangements are not in the best
long-term interests of the tribe. These pressures may lead to fre-
quent personnel changes among negotiators, resulting in less than
adequate representation of tribal interests at the bargaining
table. 26 18
The penultimate results of the constraints placed on tribes by
the federal leasing system and the foregoing factors are potential-
ly perpetual leases to explore for and produce uranium, and ab-
surdly low royalties. 269 The ultimate result is a siphoning of
capital from the reservation, where it is needed to fuel tribal
economies, to the federal government, which, through its various
social programs, tends to keep tribal societies in a perpetual state
of peonage. .Despite great natural resource wealth, reservations
are still some of the most economically deprived areas of the
country. For example, most traditional Navajo homes have no
electricity, and the unemployment rate has been between 30%
and 60% during the last decade.2 7° The situation has been com-
pared by at least one commentator to that which existed in third
world countries colonized by the overdeveloped countries prior to
their increased political sophistication in the 1970s: resource
development is financed by corporations outside the Indian
economies and proceeds of the development are drawn off the
reservations by the industrial needs of the "center" (national
266. AIPRC FINAL REPORT, app., supra note 221, at 144.
267. This is in essence what happened in the Peshlakai suit, where several Navajo
residents affected by the Mobil in situ project decided to resist the tribal government's
"bullish" stance on development and brought their own suit to stop the project.
268. For example, the AIPRC suggested that Shell Oil Company, in its negotiations
with the Crow Tribe, use the pressure of a quick deal to create dissension within the tribe,
eventually causing the replacement of one negotiator with another who apparently was
more willing to deal with the company on its own terms. AIPRC FINAL REPORT, app.,
supra note 221, at 144.
269. Low royalties for uranium have been discussed ante; the perpetual nature of
leases is caused by the ambiguous wording of 25 U.S.C. § 196 (1970) (the tribal leasing
statute), which limits the lease terms to ten years, but then goes on to add, "and as long
thereafter as minerals are produced in paying quantities." Many companies have inter-
preted this to mean, not unreasonably, that they have a lease for the full length of their
operations.
270. Henderson, supra note 169.
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economy). The capital produced from sale of resources is
primarily used to fund social programs to offset the economically
depressed "periphery" (the reservation) rather than to develop
internal productive industries.2 7' The inability of tribes to arrest
these transfers of value by levying property, severance, and
related taxes augments the drain of capital resources from Indian
lands, particularly when combined with the effect state and
federal taxation of these same operations has on the ultimate
price of development.
Conclusion
Indian tribes in the San Juan Basin region of the American
Southwest are in the midst of an unprecedented uranium mining
boom. Rapid development of their uranium resources has had
ripple effects in almost every area of these tribes' day-to-day exis-
tences: the physical environment is being dramatically altered;
their traditional Indian religions are under attack from bulldozers
and drilling rigs; their ancient social customs are being challenged
by the influx of thousands of non-Indian immigrants; and their
very economic survival is at stake.
On the other hand, as many of their leaders are quick to point
out, uranium development offers tremendous short-term possibil-
ities for economic growth. Managed properly, revenue from ura-
nium production could serve as the basis for building tribal
economies independent of federal manipulation, signaling the
beginning of a new era of self-determination in all aspects of In-
dian life.
Before this can occur, non-Indian government and corporate
leaders must demonstrate a deeper sensitivity to Indian concerns,
and Indian leaders must establish cohesive political and economic
foundations within their tribes on which to base their energy
development plans.
271. Ruffing, supra note 207, at 17-18.
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